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Food  Prices  and  Infation 
EVERY ADMINISTRATION  SINCE WORLD WAR II has worried  about in- 
flation  or recession  at one time or another  during  its term  in office-some- 
times simultaneously.  But except  for the period  immediately  after  World 
War II and the Korean  War year, 1951,  the price record of the United 
States was admirable  by world standards  until the mid-1960s, when 
the pressures  of expenditures  on the Vietnam  War  again  made  inflation  a 
serious  economic  and political  issue. 
By the end of 1971  the inflation  rate  had subsided  and "full  employment 
without  inflation"  was once again  a reasonable  promise  if not quite  a real- 
ity. Meanwhile  discussion  of macroeconomic  issues  focused  on monetary 
versus  fiscal  policy,  shifting  Phillips  curves,  and the use of public  employ- 
ment  programs  to avoid "stagflation." 
But suddenly  professors  and policy makers  alike were  confronted  with 
a new phenomenon,  which originated  in the late 1960s  and exploded in 
1972-73.  For the first  time since the Korean  War farm and food prices 
began  to contribute  substantially  to inflationary  pressures  in the economy. 
Food prices  have significance  even beyond  the 25 percent  of the cost of 
living  index  they  represent.  Politically,  they  probably  are  the most sensitive 
item in the index  inasmuch  as people  buy food far more frequently  than 
services  and other  commodities,  and these other  items change  in form if 
not in function  over  time. 
Note: I have benefited  from the comments of James Bonnen, Carroll  Brunthaver, 
Lowell Hardin,  Glenn Johnson, Vernon  Sorenson,  John Schnittker,  and participants  in 
the Brookings  panel. 
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Economic  advisers  were surprised,  if not confused,  by this new turn of 
events,  for  they  understood  neither  its causes  nor its cure.  Their  ignorance 
and confusion  arose  partly  from  the fact that the legislative  and executive 
branches  tend  to make  food policy  in isolation,  even  though,  as contempo- 
rary  events  amply  demonstrate,  it is deeply  significant  to total national  and 
international  economic  policy. 
As visible  evidence  of this isolation,  the last full-blown  hearings  on agri- 
culture  and the nonfarm  economy  by the Joint Economic  Committee  of 
the Congress  were  held in 1957;  Gary  L. Seevers,  appointed  in June  1973, 
is the first card-carrying  agricultural  economist  to be a member  of the 
Council  of Economic  Advisers  since  1961  and  only  the fourth  in the  history 
of the council;  and the White House and State Department  have aban- 
doned  any serious  attempts  to liberalize  agricultural  provisions  in the last 
three  GATT  negotiations. 
Agricultural  price,  income,  and trade  policies  have rested  largely  in the 
hands  of farmer-oriented  congressional  committees;  the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture,  which  views  commercial  farmers  as its primary  clients;  and 
the director  of the Bureau  of the Budget,  whose  major  concern  is to hold 
down  expenditures  on programs  to support  farm  prices  and incomes.  The 
Council of Economic Advisers  has injected  itself into the agricultural 
policy process  only sporadically,  primarily  on issues relating  to subsidy 
costs, and with  limited  success. 
This neglect  of farm  policy  has now ended,  temporarily  at least, as the 
events  since late 1972  have made food and fiber  prices  the leader  in the 
worst  inflationary  march  since  the late 1940s.  This  paper  examines  several 
questions.  First,  what  has been  the role of farm  and  food prices  in the cur- 
rent inflation?  Second,  what short-term  events  and long-term  policies  led 
to the serious  rise  in these  prices?  Third,  are  recent  and  current  food prices 
merely  a temporary  aberration  arising  from  bad policy and bad luck or 
do they represent  a new and permanent  source  of inflationary  pressure  in 
the economy?  Finally, what are the economic  implications  of what has 
already  occurred  and is likely  to occur  in the next year  or two? 
Food Prices and Inflation 
The sudden  and unusual  contribution  that retail  food prices  have  made 
to inflation  is shown  in Table 1, which  presents  simple  ratios  of the index 
of these prices to that for all other items in the consumer  price index. Dale E. Hathaway  65 
Table 1.  Ratio of Consumer  Price Index for Food to Index for All 
Items Less Food, Annually, 1954-73, Monthly, 1972-74 
Based on indexes, 1967 =  100 
Annual  ratio  Monthly  ratio 
Year  Ratio  Month  1972  1973  1974 
1954  1.04 
1955  1.02 
1956  1.01  January  0.97  1.01  1.13 
1957  1.01  February  0.98  1.03  1.15 
1958  1.03  March  0.98  1.05  1.15 
1959  1.00  April  0.98  1.06 
1960  0.99  May  0.98  1.06 
1961  0.99  June  0.98  1.07 
1962  0.99  July  0.99  1.08 
1963  0.99  August  0.99  1.14 
1964  0.99  September  0.99  1.13 
1965  1.00  October  0.98  1.11 
1966  1.02  November  0.98  1.12 
1967  1.00  December  0.99  1.13 
1968  0.99 
1969  0.99 
1970  0.98 
1971  0.97 
1972  0.98 
1973  1.08 
Sources: Economic  Report  of the  President,  February  1974, p. 301; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News 
Release, USDL-74-188 (April 19, 1974), Table 2. 
From 1954  to 1972,  the ratio  moved  in the narrow  range  from 97 to 104. 
Only  in 1958  and 1966  did  it rise  as much  as 0.02.  On  the whole,  food prices 
rose a bit less rapidly  than nonfood prices.  However,  the ratio of food 
prices  to all other  prices  took off in January  1973.  Rising  at an increasingly 
rapid  rate throughout  much of the year, food prices  turned  into a torch 
that fueled  the worst  inflation  in more  than two decades.  Thus,  compared 
with a year  earlier,  the CPI at the end of 1973  was up 8.8 percent  and its 
food component  was up 20.1 percent.  Food prices  rose four times  as rap- 
idly during  1973  as did nonfood  items;  and economic  policy  makers  con- 
fronted  a source  of inflation  that  traditional  monetary  and  fiscal  tools were 
impotent  to cap. 
One shift involved  in the recent  rise in retail  food prices  was especially 
significant.  Basically,  from 1955  to 1965  the prices  of food and fiber  at the 
farm level were stable-especially in the crop component  of the index, 
which  averaged  less in 1970  than  in 1955  (Table  2). But starting  in 1965,  in I-  cso  In  I  o 
m  t-  iOoooo  OOOCNO 
-t 
I-  knC4WI0  t-  e  V  ~ 
q  k  C71  .X 
'i  0-- "-  N  1  00  )e 
0'  I 
A  ~~~~E  (ON  0  ON(N  I  0NO  C  N  NC 
~~~~~~~~"t  q  oo (N  m  O  I^N 
O 
A 
S  oo oo  ooX  t  N  N  o~a  No0oo 
o~~~~~~~~c  tt  CX  c N oo  ^  mt  O  oeo 
1.  00a  ON 
N  ~ N 
\0  000 
riA 
^~~  ~~~~~~~~  .  .  .  ... 
X~~~~~~~~~~~0  OC  00  Ct  O  N  C?  o  N  Co  (3  C 
Y~~~~~~~~~~~"  C  1o< 01  0oC  l 
Po  OC  0  00  0  00  0  00  OC CN C 
s-  -  tON 
v~~~~~~~~~~~i  tn  tni  A  o  ,  , 
oN oo  C  00  o  oo  oo a 
II  1001  s?  c  to  Cooo -ct-0  0W  0  t-  W  0  - 
r-.q  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  - 
0- 
00  C~~  00  0  (0~~  ~c  00  en ~~c  10 
IS, 
r-.q  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  . 
OC)  W)  en  00  eq  00  N  C)~~~~~~00~ 
0  0 
---  -- 
00~  Zl0  0 
---  -  ---  00-  N-  0 
: 
C  -  '.-  r  .-  .  -  -.  en  --  N  -  i  -  -  t-  -0  0-  oo 
N  en  W  00  0 
r-14  r-.q  r--o  . 
ota~~~0efoo  OtOOef-  ~~~~~-~~CMot'r  )  e  o.0 
0~~0~~000  -~~~~CMM  ICMCM ~~~~ene j-  'r  ~ 
-  -  -  - -  -  -  -  -  ,-4  -  -  -~~~~~~~  c-  oo- 
en  00  0~  r4  r4  cli  14  W;  r4  0~  116 C;  o  o6 
C'  C,  0  0  1,1  N  N  N  enen  Zl  Jo  W 
CM  ~ ~~~i-  ~~~  0 68  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
every year but 1967 and 1971 the prices received by farmers for livestock 
and products increased, with a resulting slow but fairly steady increase in 
the index of all farm prices. In 1971 the index moved further upward even 
though the livestock production cycle led to a slight reduction in livestock 
prices. The index continued upward irregularly  throughout 1972, marking 
advances in eight of the twelve months, including a 5 percent advance in 
December alone. This acceleration gathered even greater momentum in 
1973, with crop prices leading the way. Furthermore, farm prices were 
in the van of inflation: from December 1972 to December 1973, they rose 
34 percent, while wholesale and retail food prices were up 23 percent and 
20 percent, respectively. 
Thus, in essence, the last twenty years comprise three distinct periods: 
(1) stable farm prices were a stabilizing force on the consumer price index 
from the mid-1950s until about 1969; (2) from 1969 to 1972 farm and food 
prices essentially matched the nonfood rate of inflation; and (3) beginning 
in late 1972 and continuing into early 1974, farm and food prices have been 
a major source of the rise in the cost of living. From  1972:4 to  1973:4 
food prices accounted for 55 percent of the rise in the CPI.1 
Recently, other countries have been caught in the same squeeze or worse, 
as Table 3 demonstrates. Various types of countries experienced different 
patterns of behavior of food prices. First, the major developed and food- 
exporting countries, such as the United  States, Canada, Australia, and 
France, enjoyed a decade of relatively stable food  prices in the 1960s; a 
modest rise occurred in  1966 because the great drought in India exerted 
pressure on grain exports and hence on prices. 
Second, the major developed food-importing nations-Japan,  Germany, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  Italy-experienced  much  the  same  stability 
in food prices during the sixties, as these prices were dependent on their 
internal  supports,  which  were  usually  above  world  markets,  and  on 
the ready availability of imported food and feed grains at or below these 
internal prices. Generally, the rise in prices of nonfood items exceeded that 
for food at retail; in that sense farm prices held down the overall rate of 
inflation. In Japan, however, the rise in the index of food prices exceeded 
that in the overall CPI in eight of the nine years, 1961-69. 
Finally, a number of less developed countries-whether  self-sufficient 
1. Joel Popkin, "Commodity  Prices  and the U.S. Price  Level," this issue, p. 256. Dale E. Hathaway  69 
or net exporters, like Brazil, or net importers, like India and Indonesia- 
were not as fortunate as the richer ones. In India food prices have risen 
faster than the total consumer price index in about three-fourths of the 
years since 1961. Brazil and Indonesia are classic examples of runaway in- 
flation in the early 1960s, which pushed prices for food and all other items 
up at rates that are incomprehensible to most economists. Thailand, nor- 
mally  a  food  grain exporter, experienced increases in  food  prices that 
exceeded the rate for nonfood items in nine of the past thirteen years. 
In this light, an "it can't happen here" attitude on the part of economic 
advisers in the United States and other developed countries was not sur- 
prising. Given the record of 1961-72, they saw food price inflation as the 
product of backward agriculture and inadequate foreign exchange, and 
felt that they could safely ignore food prices as potential fuel on the infla- 
tionary fires in their own economies. 
The awakening came in 1973. Economic advisers in the United States 
and other rich countries found that it can happen here and with a ven- 
geance! By December 1973 retail prices for meat, poultry, and fish in the 
United States were 26.4 percent above a year earlier, cereals and bakery 
products were up 28.2 percent, dairy products 22.5 percent, and all food at 
retail 20.1 percent; wholesale prices rose even more. At that point, the end 
to the rise in retail food prices was not in sight. For one thing, the lag in 
adjustment of meat animal prices to higher feed prices was not completed. 
For another, the spread between farm and retail prices had yet to adjust to 
the higher costs in the marketing sector of the food  system as the past 
increases in the CPI were reflected in new labor and materials contracts. 
INFLATION  AND  FOOD PRICES 
The relationship of food prices and inflation works in both directions. 
Nonfood  inflation has an important effect on the supply and cost of food 
in the United States. First, U.S. farmers are heavily dependent upon pur- 
chased inputs-fertilizers,  chemicals, tractors, petroleum products, capital, 
and labor.  Maintaining or expanding output has  become  more expen- 
sive;  and it  was inevitable that, sooner  or later, some  upward shift in 
the nominal prices of farm products would be required  to spur farm output 
as demand expanded. The reasons this rise did not occur until the early 
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A second element in food prices is the transportation and marketing of 
farm products. These services are performed off the farm by large- and 
small-scale businesses whose costs steadily rise under inflation and who 
have some ability to pass these costs through to consumers. 
Thus, a spiral may be in the making. In 1973 the rise in retail food prices 
became an important source of inflation in the United States for the first 
time since the Korean War; and now, the past and current inflation has 
significant implications for current and future food prices. This situation 
poses  several questions: What set off the worldwide explosion in  farm 
product prices? Is it likely to continue, level off, or recede to  1972 levels? 
What, if any, policy actions can be taken to alleviate the situation? 
A  review of  some  of  the fundamental economics  of  the  agricultural 
industry may help to explain what happened and why. 
How the Agricultural  Economy Works 
Numerous incorrect statements and wrong decisions relating to  food 
prices emanate from persons with great professional reputations and major 
policy responsibilities. Apparently the economics of agriculture  is not fully 
understood by ministers of agriculture and is even less well perceived by 
economic advisers and ministers of finance. Agricultural economists have 
found no eager audience for their subject except in unusual times, and they 
have contributed little to the public's education. 
AGRICULTURAL  DEMAND 
Understanding begins with the basic elements of demand-(1)  popula- 
tion growth and (2) changes in personal income. In the rich countries, the 
increases in demand for farm products arising from population growth 
have been small and declining over the past two decades. But in all but a 
few poor countries, despite family planning programs, population grows at 
an appalling pace. I shall come back to this matter in another context. 
The second element in demand is growth in per capita income, which 
operates through the income elasticity of demand for food. In rich coun- 
tries like the United States, the income elasticity of demand for protein 
from animal sources-red  meat, poultry, and fish-is  high; and so is the 
income elasticity for food-related services-packaging,  convenience foods, Dale E. Hathaway  73 
and eating out.2 Moreover, food consumed in the form of animal products 
requires four to  seven times as many calories of grain per person as are 
required to  achieve  the  same  human calorie  intake  from  grain eaten 
directly. 
In poor countries the income elasticity for food grains is positive and 
relatively high.3 Thus, in less developed countries any real growth in per 
capita  income  is  translated directly into  intensified demand for  food 
grains and, progressively, into demand for animal products to  improve 
the diet, raise protein intake, and supplant vegetable protein. 
The final element on the demand side is the extremely  low price elasticity 
of demand for food in the aggregate  in both rich and poor countries. Thus, 
given demand, a modest reduction in supplies will produce sharp price 
increases, and a modest increase in supplies induces a sharp decline in 
prices. 
AGRICULTURAL  SUPPLY 
On the supply side, agriculture  in the developed countries is generally a 
capital-intensive,  labor-saving,  high-energy,  high-technology  industry. 
Western Europe uses more labor than the United States and Canada; and 
in Japan, the industry is characterized  by labor intensity and small scale, 
although it  also relies heavily on  technology.  In the developing world, 
agriculture is  primarily a  labor-intensive, capital-poor,  low-technology 
industry still carried on largely by subsistence units producing relatively 
little marketable surplus beyond family needs. 
Asset fixity.  Another characteristic of agricultural supply is that, once 
committed to agricultural  production, resources are likely to remain there 
even though returns  to them vary widely and may be quite low for extended 
periods. The specialized nature of these resources is in part responsible: 
2. The income elasticities  of selected  meats are as follows: 
United  States  Western  Europe  Japan 
Beef and veal  0.50  0.51  0.70 
Poultry  0.30  0.72  0.90 
Pork  -0.20  0.32  0.90 
All meat  0.24  0.44  0.79 
These data are from Food and Agriculture  Organization  of the United Nations, Agri- 
cultural  Commodity  Projections,  1970-1980 (Rome: FAO, 1971),  Vol. 2, Table B. 
3. For India FAO estimates  the income elasticity  for rice at 0.40;  for wheat, 0.50; 
for coarse grains, -  . 17; and for all grains  0. 25. 74  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
What is the alternative value (opportunity cost) of ground-tilling equip- 
ment elsewhere in  an economy,  whether it  be  an  $18,000  John  Deere 
tractor and plow in the United States or a wooden plow and rice-puddling 
equipment in  India? Even  in  the  United  States  and  other  developed 
economies, the same kind of  question can be  asked about  agricultural 
labor, especially that of family members on owner-operated farms. This 
characteristic is called "asset fixity," and significantly affects the output 
response to changes in product prices.4 
In advanced economies both the public and private sectors constantly 
develop new technologies that, when adopted, increase farm output; given 
low price elasticities for farm products, their adoption lowers farm prices 
and returns on many resources employed in the industry, and disgruntles 
farmers. In general this situation can be termed overcapacity, inasmuch as 
the industry has too many resources to permit all of them to earn satisfac- 
tory returns in a free market. Also implied by overcapacity is a kinked or 
even discontinuous supply curve that is highly inelastic with respect to 
falling prices; relatively elastic over a certain range of  production  with 
rising prices; and highly inelastic beyond  a  point  determined by  both 
technical and economic conditions. 
Competitive  structure. In both developed and less developed countries, 
agriculture meets most of the conditions economic theory sets out for  a 
competitive industry. It has many producers, each of whom faces a com- 
pletely elastic demand, even though the aggregate demand for its  total 
output is highly inelastic. This structure  provides an incentive for the rapid 
adoption of output-increasing technology by the individual farmer where 
it is available and other constraints do not interfere.  One important element 
of the underlying conditions for a competitive industry is lacking, how- 
ever-perfect  knowledge on the part of producers regarding future output 
prices at the time production and investment decisions are made.5 
4. Asset fixity characterizes  resources in agriculture  that earn an amount that, if 
capitalized,  exceeds their salvage value outside the industry  (opportunity  cost) and is 
less than their acquisition  value (the cost of currently  acquiring  similar  assets to enter 
the industry).  This concept  was developed  by Glenn L. Johnson  in "Supply  Function- 
Some  Facts  and Notions,"  in Agricultural Adjustment Problems in a Growing Economy 
(Iowa State College  Press,  1958),  pp. 74-93, and is discussed  at length  in Dale E. Hatha- 
way,  Government and Agriculture: Public Policy  in a  Democratic  Society  (Macmillan, 
1963),  Chap. 4. 
5. Futures  markets  of a year's duration  do little to reduce this uncertainty,  because 
most capital investments  are for much longer periods and the production  period for 
most livestock products  substantially  exceeds  this period. Dale E. Hathaway  75 
It is this combination of inelastic aggregate demand, asset fixity, rapid 
availability and adoption  of new technology, and competitive structure 
that resulted in continuing overcapacity  in agriculture  in the United States, 
Canada, and other developed countries from the mid-1950s until about 
1970. This situation meant low farm prices; low food prices despite rising 
marketing costs; and on the average, low incomes for farmers relative to 
nonfarmers, except in countries with extraordinary government subsidies 
or protective measures.6 The agricultural policies of both rich and poor 
countries were made in this context over the past two decades, bringing 
them to the situation of 1973. 
Calorie conversion. Animal agriculture in the United  States and most 
other rich countries is essentially a process by which calories in the form of 
grain, protein supplement, and in some cases forage, are converted into 
calories that are consumed in the form of red meat and poultry. Perhaps 
the purest conversion is in the modern broiler and egg industry, where the 
price of feed grains and protein supplements make up 70 percent of total 
production costs and are reflected almost immediately in the prices of the 
final products. If, as in the case of the United States in the summer of 1973, 
the retail price of broilers or eggs is suddenly frozen, production  drops 
precipitously and the products disappear from the retail store. 
Much the same holds true for milk and pork production in the United 
States, although the longer  production  process  retards the  adjustment 
somewhat. In Western Europe, where milk and beef are still largely joint 
products from a dairy industry, using more forage (grass) and less feed 
grains, the adjustment of meat and milk output and prices to altered prices 
of feed grains and protein supplements is somewhat smaller and slower, 
assuming no change in demand. 
Excess capacity in grain production in the United States and other devel- 
oped countries in the  1960s brought low  grain prices, and government 
intervention kept them stable. Such prices in turn encouraged the expan- 
sion of livestock and poultry production based upon the heavy feeding of 
grains and protein supplements, at the same time that low prices and rising 
consumer incomes were stimulating heavier consumption of poultry and 
meats. 
6. Developed  countries  that  import  farm  products  also were  contributors  to the excess 
capacity  problem.  In all cases they used some kind of import  barriers  or income supple- 
ments to maintain  high internal  prices.  Thus, the resources  employed  in agriculture  in 
those countries  could not earn acquisition  costs in the absence  of such protection. 76  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Supply  in  the LDCs.  In the underdeveloped countries the agricultural 
supply  situation  is  even  more complex.  The  industry is  plagued with 
massive underemployment, human and capital resources with low  pro- 
ductivity, and antiquated technology. Thus, the  supply curve for farm 
products is highly inelastic due to physical constraints, and increases in 
supply can come only from the expansion of cultivated area or adoption 
of new technology by millions of illiterate or semiliterate peasant farmers. 
Moreover, since most of the new technologies are land saving but capital 
using (high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and so  on) and require 
skilled management, they are in most cases adopted slowly and only in the 
few areas where credit, risk, and management conditions allow. Thus, the 
Green Revolution, as it is commonly understood, is not won. The battle 
plans are still being formed. 
Despite their difficulties in expanding agricultural output, the under- 
developed countries have sacrificed  the price incentive needed to speed the 
adoption of new technology to pursue a cheap food policy for their urban 
consumers. Over much of the period from 1955 to 1970, the leaders in the 
LDCs were abetted in those policies by the large-scale provision of "sur- 
plus"  grains generated by  the  excess capacity  in  developed  countries, 
which was provided generously by the United States under the Food  for 
Peace program of  the Agricultural Trade Development  and Assistance 
Act of  1954 (Public Law 480), and by other countries via various price- 
cutting devices. 
Thus, in both rich and poor countries the price of grain largely deter- 
mines the price of food: in the former, because the prices of grains and 
protein supplements are major determinants of the prices of meat, poultry, 
and dairy products, and in the latter because grain is the primary food for 
humans. Moreover, there is a high elasticity of substitution between grains 
used for animal feed in the United States and other developed countries 
and the grain consumed directly in poor countries. Thus, in world markets 
there is a cross elasticity between food  and feed grains that means that 
world shifts in the supply or demand of either affect U.S. prices. 
Dealing with Excess Capacity 
In the United  States and other industrial countries, a combination of 
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omy emerged soon after World War II, but was temporarily masked by 
the Korean War. Farm prices in the United States began to fall in 1952 and 
continued their decline through much of the decade. The decline in prices 
and income was mitigated, however, by the policies instituted before and 
during World War II, which required the U.S.  government to  intervene 
through the  Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) by  purchasing key 
farm commodities-wheat,  feed grains, cotton,  and manufactured dairy 
products-at  prices well above market-clearing  levels. 
The U.S.  system of agricultural  price supports and production controls 
is extremely complicated. An outgrowth of the New Deal, it survived the 
war in the form of floor prices guaranteed by government purchases of 
grains, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, and manufactured dairy prod- 
ucts. The postwar prices were the wartime  prices set to encourage maximum 
agricultural  output, and the level was tied to, and moved up with, nonfarm 
prices. 
These support programs were supplemented by  acreage controls  de- 
signed in the thirties to prevent an untoward accumulation of  surpluses. 
Even so, throughout the fifties and early sixties, the acreage of individual 
crops could  not  be  reduced below  certain minimums; thus with rising 
yields per acre, the supply of supported products exceeded demand at the 
supported price, and the U.S.  government had to  acquire and hold the 
excess. Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the chief agricultural 
policy makers, supported by many agricultural economists, argued that 
excessively high support prices were the chief stimulus to excessive farm 
output; and major policy efforts were made to lower government support 
prices so as to hold down the steadily rising stocks of grains bought and 
held by the government. 
This policy stirred a continuous battle between the administration and 
Congress over price support levels, the latter slowly retreating under the 
pressure of rising costs for acquiring,  carrying, and disposing of the mount- 
ing stocks of farm commodities. To halt the rapid rise of stocks of grains, 
cotton, and manufactured dairy products during the mid-1950s, a special 
land-retirement program was introduced in the Agricultural Act  of  1956 
providing payments to  induce farmers to  plant less than their allotted 
acreages of cotton,  wheat, and tobacco.7 Not  until the early 1960s did 
Congress finally pass a program to control farm output effectively with- 
out building stocks. 
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Support programs  priced U.S. farm products above world market prices, 
and to maintain export markets, the United States resorted to export sub- 
sidies in two forms. One was a straight government payment to commercial 
exporters to make up the difference between domestic market prices and 
the world price, which in turn was strongly influenced by the size of U.S. 
export subsidies. 
The second was the famous P.L. 480. It allowed sales of U.S. farm prod- 
ucts to  developing countries for  foreign currencies; donations  to  meet 
emergencies; and later, sales for long-term credits with low interest rates 
and long repayment  schedules. These commodities came at first from CCC 
stocks, but later from commercial supplies; the government paid U.S.  ex- 
porters and accepted foreign currencies, which were held to pay U.S. gov- 
ernment costs overseas, in-country development programs, and the like. 
Thus, from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s, the United States was run- 
ning a three-price system for most  commodities: (1)  a domestic price; 
(2) a lower, subsidized, price for commercial exports for several crops; and 
(3) an even lower subsidized price for noncommercial exports to less devel- 
oped countries. 
Importers  had varied emotions toward U.S. policies. The European Eco- 
nomic Community used U.S.  export subsidies as an argument to  build 
its variable levy system. The United Kingdom and Japan presumably were 
pleased with U.S. willingness to subsidize their low-cost imports, as were 
LDCs that were short of food and thus importing. 
Countries that competed with the United  States for export markets, 
including some LDCs, were more of one mind, especially about P.L. 480, 
because they believed-probably  correctly-that  part of these sales de- 
prived them of commercial exports. But, since the United States is by far 
the world's largest grain exporter, they accepted its control of world prices 
for commercial exports of grains, if not always without protest. 
Professional agricultural economists (including myself) were virtually 
unanimous in their condemnation of U.S. price and income policies. They 
had argued for years that U.S.  farm prices should be  allowed to  drop 
toward market-clearing  levels to permit exports without subsidies and to 
reduce the incentives for expanding U.S. agricultural  capacity. In their con- 
cern for farmers'  welfare, however, they supported limited direct payments 
to  compensate for lower prices; and most  agreed that these  payments 
should aim to induce land retirement  as a method of controlling output and 
prices at stable levels. These professionals were joined by the prestigious Dale E. Hathaway  79 
business group, the Committee for Economic Development, in a 1962 re- 
port.8 This and similar statements were vigorously opposed by the admin- 
istration, which at the time was attempting to push through a program to 
ensure high prices, production controls on individual farmers, and export 
subsidies. 
Members of the new Democratic administration  fought many battles on 
agricultural policy during 1961-64. They correctly assessed the problem 
as one of overcapacity and immediately set a goal of easing the budget 
burden occasioned by the acquiring,  carrying, and disposing of "excessive" 
stocks of farm products. But their cure was unacceptable to a majority of 
the  profession, the farmers, and the Congress. Defeated  in its  attempt 
to take a comprehensive restrictive approach in 1962, and again in 1963 
(with respect to wheat), the USDA  turned in 1964 and 1965 to the policy 
of low prices and direct income supplements that it had earlier opposed. 
The new program, initiated under President Kennedy and finally passed 
in the early months of the Johnson administration, had three major fea- 
tures: (1) the drastic lowering of support prices on wheat, feed grains, and 
cotton; (2) the inauguration of direct cash payments to the producers of 
these crops in lieu of the higher market prices; and (3) a large-scale land- 
retirement program to  reduce the  excess capacity for  grain. The land- 
retirement program combined the carrot of  lucrative payments for  the 
acreage reductions with the stick of withholding the direct payments from 
nonparticipants. Acreage withheld under government programs jumped 
from 28.7 million in 1960 to 53.7 million in 1961 and then varied between 
55 million and 65 million over the next five years (Table 4). Except for 1967 
and 1971, acreage withheld hovered in or near this range through 1972. 
In addition, the P.L. 480 sales were continued. 
This program had several impacts. First, the acres planted to grains in 
the United States fell from about 200 million in 1954 to around 150 million 
in the sixties, mirroring the rise in land withheld under government pro- 
grams (Table 4). Second, the lower support prices ended the need for export 
subsidies on feed grains and cotton and lowered the subsidy for wheat. The 
lower domestic prices also fostered major increases in U.S. poultry and live- 
stock output by reducing one of its main costs, as well as encouraging an 
expanding poultry and livestock industry in Japan and several other coun- 
tries. Thus, much of U.S. policy was aimed at expansion of export demand. 
8. An Adaptive  Program  for Agriculture,  A Statement  on National Policy by the Re- 
search  and  Policy Committee  of the Committee  for Economic  Development  (CED, 1962). 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table 4.  U.S. Harvested  Acreage of Wheat and Feed Grains, and Acreage 
Withheld  under  Government  Programs,  Marketing  Years 1954-55 to 1974-75 
Millions of acres 
Acres 
withheld 
Harvested  acreage  under 
Marketing  government 
year"  Total  Wheat  Feed  grainsb  programs 
1954-55  200.2  54.4  145.8  0.0 
1955-56  193.1  47.3  145.8  0.0 
1956-57  180.4  49.8  130.6  13.6 
1957-58  184.2  43.8  140.5  27.8 
1958-59  187.8  53.0  134.8  27.1 
1959-60  191.7  51.7  139.9  22.5 
1960-61  188.6  51.9  136.7  28.7 
1961-62  156.9  51.6  105.3  53.7 
1962-63  145.6  43.7  101.9  64.7 
1963-64  150.6  45.5  105.1  56.1 
1964-65  146.9  49.8  97.1  55.1 
1965-66  145.5  49.6  96.0  56.3 
1966-67  147.7  49.9  97.8  63.2 
1967-68  159.6  58.8  100.8  40.7 
1968-69  152.4  55.3  97.1  49.4 
1969-70  143.2  47.6  95.6  58.0 
1970-71  142.6  43.6  99.0  57.0 
1971-72  154.0  47.7  106.3  37.1 
1972-73  141.3  47.3  94.0  61.5 
1973-74  156.2  53.9  102.3  19.5 
1974-75  171.4  64.3  107.1  2.6 
Sources: Harvested acreage, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural  Statistics, various years, and 
USDA,  Foreign Agriculture  Circular,  FG6-74 (March 1974), p.  18; acres withheld, provided by  USDA, 
Agricultural  Stabilization and Conservation Service. The figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
a.  The text frequently  refers to only the first calendar year designated, although the marketing  year spans 
portions of two successive calendar years. 
b. Feed grains are corn, sorghum, barley, and oats. 
With the advent of a Republican administration in 1969, the drive for less 
government intervention in agriculture and for expanded export markets 
was vigorously renewed,  building upon the legislation enacted in the 1960s. 
The previous Democratic administration had finally espoused an export- 
oriented agriculture, but  the Democrats had  sought to  manage supply 
through land retirement and moderate government stocks, while Repub- 
licans  hoped  to  avoid  government management of  supply and  reserve 
stocks of any kind. Like farmers,  Republicans were convinced that govern- 
ment stocks, rather than excess capacity, were depressing farm prices. Dale E. Hathaway  81 
One factor militating against the effects of these export expansion poli- 
cies was the protectionist stance of the EEC. With its variable levy on 
grains, the EEC protected its producers by maintaining internal prices at 
high levels-twice  the U.S. support price in the 1960s-and  thereby made 
imports of wheat and feed grains a residual. The EEC also provided sub- 
sidies for surplus wheat to be used either as domestic feed or exports. The 
high internal grain prices discouraged intensive feeding of livestock and 
thus reduced the need for imports of feed grains and, by implication, the 
opportunity for U.S. exports. 
The  other major grain-exporting countries followed  policies  different 
from those of the United States. Both Canada and Australia operate na- 
tionalized marketing  boards designed, in the case of wheat, to deal with the 
export trade. Acting as state trading units, the boards sell their wheat for 
what it will bring in world markets, thus subjecting their farmers to market 
forces, although both countries have an interest in grain prices that will 
satisfy their producers. Neither country imposes acreage controls, but in 
both, the wheat marketing boards can and do set delivery quotas for indi- 
vidual farmers. Since farm storage capacity is limited, this practice effec- 
tively deters output, although the farmer can use the land to raise either 
wheat for feed or feed grains that are not so controlled. 
Throughout the developed world the psychology of farmers, political 
leaders, and agricultural economists for the decade and a half after the 
mid-fifties consequently was influenced by overcapacity, surpluses, and the 
search for markets, especially export markets. With the advent of the Green 
Revolution in the mid-1960s, fears of world surpluses worsened. Both the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the 
USDA  projected that the food-deficit LDCs would become surplus grain 
producers; and it was proposed that exporting advanced economies restrict 
their agricultural output even more to provide export markets for LDCs 
in deficit developed countries. 
However, slowly but surely several forces emerged to allay these fears. 
First, during the 1960s, the demand for farm products, especially grains, 
was rising, as world grain consumption, as inferred  from "disappearance," 
rose every year, increasing from less than 900 million metric tons in 1960- 
61 to  1,100 million metric tons in 1969-70.9 
9. Disappearance  is production  minus the increase  in stocks: since  not all stocks  are 
measured  and recorded,  it is not a precise  measure  of actual consumption. 
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Second,  excess  capacity  was  slowly  absorbed  in the developed  countries. 
The reduction  of cropland  planted  was a major element in the United 
States.  Excess  labor  also was  slowly  disappearing,  especially  from  the mod- 
ern commercial  farms  that account  for most agricultural  output.  A com- 
bination  of retirements,  a sharp  drop  in new  entrants,  and a steady  shift  to 
nonagricultural  employment  gradually  reduced  the labor "trapped"  in 
commercial  agriculture.  This was true  even in the United States,  although 
its nonfarm  unemployment  rate  was  high  relative  to other  developed  coun- 
tries,10  for that high average  rate was concentrated  among young, non- 
white,  urban  dwellers,  some of whom  were  migrants  from agriculture  but 
many  of whom  had  neither  the experience  nor  desire  to work  on or manage 
farms.  This decline  was first  manifested  in the livestock  industry,  which  is 
more labor intensive  than crop production.  It probably  accounts  for the 
slowdown  in the growth  of livestock  output  that  began  in 1969  and caused 
prices  of livestock  products  to rise  relative  to those  of feed  grains.  In general, 
labor  mobility  rates  were  highest  near  large  metropolitan  areas,  which  also 
tend  to be the centers  of U.S. livestock  production,  especially  milk. More- 
over,  as the Hathaway  and Perkins  study  showed,  the mobility  rates  were 
not inversely  related  to farm income, suggesting  that outmigration  from 
commercial  farms  was as high as or higher  than  that from  the small  farms 
that contribute  little to U.S. output. 
Third,  despite  the optimism  of the  late 1960s  the Green  Revolution  in the 
LDCs did not spread  as widely  or as rapidly  as expected;  and the result 
was a rising  gap between  food output  and consumption  over  much of the 
developing  world,  which  was filled  by increasing  imports  from the devel- 
oped countries. 
Finally, the discovery  of environmental  and health problems  by the 
United States  in the late 1960s  had a special  impact  on agriculture.  DDT 
and several other low-cost pesticides  were banned, forcing farmers  to 
higher-cost  substitutes.  The  Food and  Drug  Administration  prohibited  the 
use of certain  feed  additives,  which  raised  the poundage  of feed grains  in a 
pound  of beef.  Moreover,  numerous  antipollution  laws  relating  to disposal 
of animal  wastes prevented  the expansion  of, or in some cases actually 
10. For a discussion  of the effects of unemployment  rates on farm-nonfarm  mobility, 
see Dale E. Hathaway  and Brian E. Perkins, "Occupational  Mobility and Migration 
from Agriculture,"  in Rural  Poverty in the United  States, A Report by the President's 
National Advisory Commission  on Rural Poverty (U.S. Government  Printing Office, 
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closed, large-scale  animal  feeding  operations,  and raised  production  costs 
without  increasing  output.  In the main,  these  probably  were  good policies, 
but consumers  have had to pay for them  in the cost of food. 
What Caused the 1972-73 Explosion in Food Prices? 
In 1972-73 almost every  nation in the world experienced  inflationary 
pressures  due to increases  in food prices.  While this has been a serious 
problem  for the United  States  and other  developed  countries,  it has meant 
near  disaster  for poor  countries  forced  to import  food grains.  The  explana- 
tions currently  put forth for this alarming  state of affairs  fall into four 
categories:  (1) the weather,  (2) the Russian  wheat  deal,  (3) the influence  of 
affluence,  and (4) the return  of Malthus. 
THE WEATHER 
Crop production  throughout  the world is still dependent  upon the 
weather,  particularly  the timing  and  adequacy  of rainfall,  since  most of the 
world's  crops  are grown  without  irrigation.  Because  of basic  climatic  fac- 
tors, some regions  of the earth  are subject  to greater  annual  variations  in 
weather  than others.  Two regions  with large  populations-the USSR and 
Asia, which  is dependent  upon  the monsoons-are subject  to wide  year-to- 
year  variations  in rainfall  and crop output. 
Economists  tend to view the weather  as a probability  function  with a 
random  distribution.  Climatologists  do not do so, and if they are correct, 
the climatic  shifts  and  accompanying  weather  pattern  help to explain  both 
the two decades  of surplus  capacity  and the problems  the world is now 
experiencing.  Some  of them  argue  that  the world  had  better  than  "normal" 
weather  from  the mid-1950s  to the early  1970s,  thus  accounting  for the sur- 
pluses. Regardless  of the underlying  cause, there  is no question  that the 
weather  in 1972  was adverse  over  large  areas  with  huge  populations.  Most 
of South  and  Southeast  Asia suffered  from  inadequate  monsoon  rains.  The 
USSR had one of the most severe  droughts  in recent history and sub- 
Sahara  Africa  was similarly  afflicted.  The  net result  was a decline  in world 
grain  production  (Table  5). Reflecting  the unfavorable  weather,  the world 
output  of grains  declined  some  40  million  tons,  or more  than  3 percent  from 
the previous  year's  high. But world  declines  in grain  output  are not new. 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  5.  World Production  and Consumption  of Wheat,  Rice,  and Coarse 
Grains,  Marketing  Years  1960-61  to 1974-75 
Millions of metric  tons 
Wheat  Coarse  grainsb  Total 
Market-  Rice 
ing  Produc- Consump-  produc-  Produc- Consump- Produc-  Consump- 
year  tion  tion  tiona  tion  tion  tion  tion 
1960-61  240.4  237.3  236.5  408.4  398.8  885.3  872.6 
1961-62  226.5  238.3  240.9  389.7  404.5  857.1  883.7 
1962-63  256.3  250.9  243.0  406.6  408.7  905.9  902.6 
1963-64  236.9  245.4  248.9  416.2  412.8  902.0  907.1 
1964-65  273.4  262.3  259.9  415.5  421.7  948.8  943.9 
1965-66  262.7  281.5  250.4  432.6  449.1  945.7  981.0 
1966-67  303.5  280.7  248.1  461.4  459.0  1,013.0  987.8 
1967-68  292.8  289.6  275.3  485.0  475.0  1,053.1  1,039.9 
1968-69  325.0  300.4  281.0  489.5  486.7  1,095.5  1,068.1 
1969-70  306.1  315.8  280.8  512.4  515.7  1,099.3  1,112.3 
1970-71  309.4  328.6  298.2  507.6  522.9  1,115.2  1,149.7 
1971-72  341.5  342.3  299.4  561.3  544.0  1,202.2  1,185.7 
1972-73c  333.8  358.2  285.7  545.5  565.0  1,165.0  1,208.9 
1973-74d  367.0  358.0  309.5  598.5  594.5  1,275.0  1,262.0 
1974-75d  375.2  365.5  305.0  621.6  605.1  1,301.8  1,275.6 
Sources: Tables 6, 7, 8; rice production, 1960-61 through 1962-63, provided  by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
a. Rice consumption is assumed to be approximately  equal to rice production, since few countries main- 
tain appreciable  stocks and world trade in rice averages about 5 percent of annual production. 
b.  Coarse grains are rye, barley, oats, corn, and sorghum. 
c.  Preliminary. 
d. Estimate. 
Total  world  grain  output  had  also  dropped  more  than  3 percent  from  1960- 
61 to 1961-62,  and by a slight  amount  from 1964-65  to 1965-66.  In these 
years,  as in 1972-73,  the declines  occurred  in the face of mounting  demand, 
and disappearance  continued  to rise. 
World  wheat  production  in 1972-73  declined  7.7 million  tons from the 
previous  year,  with  5.7 million  tons of the decline  outside  the United  States 
(Table  6). Even  so, world  wheat  production  in 1972-73  was  24 million  tons, 
or 8 percent,  above  the 1970-71  level.  In several  years  during  the  last  decade 
world  wheat  production  took larger  absolute  and  percentage  drops  than  the 
decline  from 1971-72  to 1972-73. 
World  coarse  grain  production  likewise  fell in the 1972-73  crop  year  by 
about 16 million  tons (3 percent)  from  the previous  year,  with  half the de- 
cline accounted  for by U.S. production  controls  (Table  7). Even  so, world 
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other  hand, the 1972-73  drop followed  almost  a decade  of steadily  rising 
world  production,  interrupted  only  by the  U.S. corn  blight  in 1970  and  held 
down in part  by U.S. production  controls. 
World rice production  also declined  in 1972-73,  by about 14 million 
tons, or 5 percent  of the previous  year's  output  (Table  8). But again,  world 
production  was still the highest  except  for the two preceding  crop years, 
although  the longer-term  growth  for this staple  has been  much  slower  than 
that for either  wheat or coarse  grains.  Moreover,  world  rice output  had 
fallen 12 million  tons, or 5 percent,  between  1964  and 1966. 
Thus,  in the perspective  of a decade  rather  than the centuries  preferred 
by climatologists,  the 1972-73  weather  was bad for crop production.  The 
decline  in output  was not unprecedented  for wheat  and rice;  but it was  un- 
usual  for coarse  grains,  and it marked  the first  time in the 1960s  or 1970s 
that the output of all three grains  dropped  in the same year. Still, bad 
weather  is bound  to occur  in some years,  and is accounted  for in most ex- 
pectations;  so that blaming  it for the unprecedented  rise in food prices 
implies  that current  production  should bear the full burden  of meeting 
demand  with no assistance  from stocks. 
THE RUSSIAN  WHEAT DEAL 
Probably  more  has been written  on the sale of wheat  to the USSR than 
on any other  episode  in modern  agricultural  history.  Critics  have  called  it 
everything  from stupid  to dishonest,  and defenders  everything  from good 
business  to detente.  Because  of its weather  variations,  the  USSR  has  experi- 
enced  large  year-to-year  variations  in grain  output.  Indeed,  the 1972  decline 
was not the largest  on record,  and there  are indications  that Russian  pur- 
chases  exceeded  their 1972  shortfall.11 
In the past the Russians  had sometimes  tightened  their belts and used 
reserves  or liquidated  their  livestock  herds  when grain output fell short. 
But not always;  they imported  significant  amounts  in some earlier  bad 
years-nearly 10 million  tons in 1963-64  and 8.5 million  tons in 1965-66 
(Table  9). In 1972,  for reasons  known  only to them,  they made  a political 
decision  to enter  the international  grain  markets,  in a sudden,  secretive,  and 
massive  way, to make  up for their  short  crop. And for the first  time they 
11. For an intriguing  version of the Russian grain sale, see James Trager, Amber 
Waves  of Grain  (Arthur  Fields Books, 1973).  Among other things,  Trager  advances  the 
thesis that the Russians bought the extra grain to keep the Chinese from getting it. F  <  o  u  X  o  o 
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Table 8.  World Rice Area Harvested, Yield, Production,  and Trade, 
Crop Years 1963-64 to 1974-75 
Area  Yieldb  Productionb  World  trade? 
Crop  (thousands  (quintals  (thousands  of  (thousands  of 
year"  of hectares)  per hectare)  metric tons)  metric tons) 
1963-64  120,801  20.6  248,906  7,202 
1964-65  124,531  20.9  259,910  7,510 
1965-66  123,390  20.3  250,392  7,898 
1966-67  126,154  19.7  248,127  7,366 
1967-68  128,122  21.5  275,282  6,908 
1968-69  129,846  21.6  281,009  6,453 
1969-70  130,404  21.5  280,783  6,579 
1970-71  129,657  23.0  298,190  7,285 
1971-72  133,502  22.4  299,435  7,700 
1972-73d  128,833  22.2  285,681  7,300 
1973-74e  134,403  23.6  309,500  7,400 
1974-75f  134,000  22.8  305,000  ... 
Source: Foreign  Agriculture  Circular,  EG 12-73  (October 26, 1973)  p. 15, and EG 6-74 (March 1974), p. 9. 
The area and yield figures for 1973-75, and the production figures for 1974-75, are USDA  projections. 
a.  Trade data are for calendar years, whereas production data are for the worldwide crop-harvest year. 
Years shown refer to year of harvest in the Northern Hemisphere. Harvests of Northern Hemisphere coun- 
tries are combined with those of the Southern Hemisphere, which follow immediately; thus, for example, 
the crop harvested  in the Northern Hemisphere in 1973 is combined with estimates for the Southern Hemi- 
sphere harvest that began late in 1973 and ended early in 1974; the corresponding  trade data are for calen- 
dar year 1973. 
b. Rough paddy basis. 
c.  Milled basis. 
d. Preliminary. 
e.  Estimate. 
f.  Projected. 
turned  to the United  States  as their  major  supplier.  Before  U.S. and other 
exporters  knew  what  was  happening,  the  Russians  had  contracted  to import 
15 million tons of wheat and 6 million tons of feed grains.'2 
The Russian  entry into the international  grain  market  had important 
implications.  But one must note that, while total USSR wheat imports 
increased  by  11.5 million tons from 1971-72 to  1972-73, total world 
imports  increased  by 17 million  tons and U.S. exports  by 15 million  tons 
(Table  6). Thus,  the increased  USSR imports  account  for only two-thirds 
of the increase  in world  wheat  trade,  although  most of that increase  came 
from the United States,  mainly  because  it had the grain  to sell and was 
willing  to sell it at subsidized  prices,  well  below  the current  world  price. 
However,  world  wheat  trade  had fluctuated  sharply  in earlier  years,  as 
revealed  in Table  6. Total  exports  jumped  about 13  million  tons from  1962- 
12. Figures  on the actual  grain  purchases  contracted  by the USSR differ.  The figures 
used here are the 1972-73 crop year imports as reported  by the USDA (see Table 9). Dale E. Hathaway  89 
Table 9.  Soviet Trade in Wheat and Feed Grains, Crop Years 1963-64 
to 1974-75 
Millions of metric  tons 
Wheat  Feed grains" 
Crop  year  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
1963-64  2.7  9.7  1.3  0.1 
1964-65  2.2  2.2  1.4  * 
1965-66  2.6  8.5  2.2  * 
1966-67  4.4  3.1  0.5  0.2 
1967-68  5.3  1.5  0.7  0.4 
1968-69  5.8  0.2  0.9  0.5 
1969-70  6.4  1.1  0.9  0.1 
1970-71  7.2  0.5  0.9  0.3 
1971-72  5.8  3.4  0.7  4.3 
1972-73p  1.3  14.9  0.2  5.6 
1973-74b  5.0  4.1  0.5  5.0 
1974-75b  6.0  2.0  0.5  2.5 
Source: Foreign Agriculture  Circular  (March 1974), pp. 10, 11. 
* Less than 50,000 tons. 
p Preliminary. 
a.  Feed grains are corn, sorghum, barley, and oats. 
b. Estimate. 
63 to 1963-64,  swelled  in part  by Russian  purchases,  though  not from the 
United States.  Wheat  trade  increased  by 7 million tons from 1964-65  to 
1965-66,  again  owing  partially  to Russian  imports. 
Once  the Russians  decided  to purchase  wheat  in the quantities  they did, 
what  difference  did it make  to the world  supply-demand  situation  where  it 
was acquired?  At one extreme,  it might  be contended  that subsidized  U.S. 
sales affected  only U.S. taxpayers  and the Russian  balance  of payments. 
It is  unlikely, however, that the Russians could have obtained from 
Canada  and Australia-at any price-the total quantity  they purchased, 
for both have commitments  to  regular customers  through long-term 
agreements,  and their knowledge  of and control over total export sales 
prevent  the sudden "raids"  that unregulated  private  export  trade in the 
United  States  allows.  Thus,  the unrestricted  U.S. sales  to the Russians  may 
have allowed them to buy more than they could have otherwise,  and 
certainly  the price  was right-for them.'3 
13. If, as many suspect, the Russians sold gold to pay for their grain imports, their 
purchases  may have been swelled more by the rise in the price of gold than by U.S. 
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In the case of feed  grains,  Russian  imports  could  not have  had a marked 
effect  upon  prices.  From 1963-64  to 1970-71,  the USSR was a net exporter 
of these  grains  (Table  9). In 1971-72  it became  a net importer  of 3.6 million 
tons, and  in 1972-73  of 5.4 million.  But  these  shifts  are  less than  half of the 
12 million  ton rise  in total world  exports  of coarse  grains  from 56 million 
to 68 million  tons in the 1972-73  crop year.  And they are an even smaller 
part  of the increase  in U.S. exports  of coarse  grains  from  25 million  tons in 
1971-72  to 39 million  tons in 1972-73. 
Thus,  while  Russian  purchases  may have pushed  U.S. and world  wheat 
prices  up to some  degree,  they  could  not have  had a significant  influence  in 
the case of feed grains.  The explanation  of the grain  price  explosion  must 
be sought  elsewhere. 
THE INFLUENCE  OF AFFLUENCE 
For food as a whole,  the income  elasticity  of demand  is low in wealthy 
countries.  For all foods at the farm  gate  the estimates  for the United  States 
range  from  0.15 to about  0.20. This, of course,  is an average  derived  from 
combining  relatively  high  elasticities  for meats  with  low or negative  figures 
for grains  and potatoes.  The low overall  elasticity  masks  the fact that as 
people  get  more  income,  the nature  of their  diet  changes.  In poor  countries, 
the diet consists largely of grains consumed  directly-rice, wheat, and 
maize.  As consumers  become  more  affluent,  however,  they obtain  a lower 
proportion  of calories  from grain  sources  and a higher  proportion  from 
animal  proteins-poultry,  fish, and red meats. 
In terms  of index  numbers  this trend  does not appear  important,  but in 
terms  of the demand  for grain  products,  it is very  important  indeed.  Table 
10 shows the change  in per capita consumption  of selected  foods in the 
major  developed  countries  from  the late forties  to 1970.  For instance,  per 
capita  consumption  of meats  in the United States  has risen  by 35 percent 
over  the past  two decades.  But consumption  has more  than  doubled  in the 
Federal  Republic  of Germany  and  has increased  eightfold  in Japan,  More- 
over, in 1970 Germany  was consuming  below the 1948-50 level in the 
United States,  and Japan  was consuming  at one-sixth  that level. Western 
Europe and Japan will probably  continue to move toward U.S. con- 
sumption  levels of red meat and poultry, unless other events halt or 
depress  their  industrial  growth  or unless  the rising  costs of these  products 
offset  the effects  of the higher  per capita  income. Dale E. Hathaway  91 
Table 10. Per Capita Consumption  of Meat, Eggs, and Fruit, Selected 
Developed Countries, 1948-50 and 1969-70 
Grams per capita per day 
Meat  Eggs  Fruit 
Country  1948-50  1969-70  1948-50  1969-70  1948-50  1969-70 
United States  224  302  59  50  293  265 
Australia  300  300  32  35  217  247 
Federal  Republic 
of Germany  80  200  14  42  115  318 
Italy  42  131  16  26  152  308 
Japan  5  41  2  39  37  136 
Spain  39  120  13  30  183  253 
USSR  n.a.  106a  n.a.  19a  n.a.  58a 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Agricultural  Adjustment in Devel- 
oped  Countries," Prepared for the Seventeenth FAO Conference, C 73/16 (FAO, September 1973; pro- 
cessed), p. 121. 
a.  1965 data. 
n.a.  Not available. 
All of this dietary  improvement  is encouraging  in terms  of welfare,  but 
it puts  tremendous  strain  on the  world's  grain-producing  resources.  It takes 
three  to four  times  the calories  in feed  grains  to produce  equivalent  calories 
in poultry,  meat, and eggs, and six to seven  times  the amount  to produce 
equivalent  calories  in grain-fed  beef. For instance,  the per capita use of 
grain  for all purposes  in 1972-73  was estimated  at 275 kilograms  in Japan, 
458 in the EEC countries,  and 850 in the United States.  In South Asia, 
where the grain is consumed  directly  by humans,  per capita use is 160 
kilograms. 
Thus, affluence  created  a secondary  demand  for grains  that has been 
growing at  a  tremendous  rate in  the wealthy countries in  the past 
decade (Table 11). It shows up most strongly  in coarse grains. In the 
period  from 1964-66  to 1972-73,  the per capita disappearance  of coarse 
grains  increased  18  percent  in the developed  market  economies  as a whole, 
18 percent  in the United  States,  and 52 percent  in Japan.  The EEC  was at 
the lower end of the spectrum  with a 12 percent  rise, reflecting  the pro- 
tectionist  policies  that kept the community  at about the same  level of net 
coarse grain  imports  over the decade. In contrast,  Japanese  imports  of 
coarse grains  have trebled-from 4.6 million to  14 million tons in the 
period 1963-64  to 1973-74.  Moreover,  in both Eastern  Europe  and the 
USSR, per capita disappearance  rose approximately  25 percent  as these 
countries  increased  livestock feeding and animal-product  consumption. *E  i-  -'~~~m  r-  l 
E~~~~~0 
(ON  W)  m  ^FNT 
00  ~  ~  ~  00~ 
0% 
Ofs 
tLt  'i  'i  4"  00  eo~ 
-o  O  t  00  eo 
,Hs  }  /S^  00O  o-4  N  o  a  0c 
PC~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
t  NX 




(ONi00O  ;  t 
n~~~~~~~, 
tn 
_  ROTB*8 
orY*!  =>N  ??  ?eDor 
-  u  a 
Cd  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
0  0  to~~ 
0  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  COu>  0 




CU  CU  0  cu  E 
+i  +  ~  w  -q  -0  to~ 
o..  u.  O 
~~  CO  u0  . Dale E. Hathaway  93 
While less developed  countries  as a group  did not expand  in this respect, 
some had large  gains.  For instance,  in East  Asia the annual  disappearance 
of coarse  grains  increased  by more  than  50 percent  over  the period  and  net 
imports  increased  fourteen  times.  Since  the  United  States  typically  accounts 
for about one-half  of world  exports  of coarse  grains  (Table  7), it has sup- 
plied much of the expansion. 
Affluence,  however,  does not greatly  spur demand  for wheat in devel- 
oped countries.  For instance,  for the period 1964-66  to 1972-73  the per 
capita  consumption  of wheat  rose 8 percent  in total in the developed  mar- 
ket economies,  including  3 percent  in the United States, 12 percent  in the 
EEC, and 6 percent  in Japan.  It rose more sharply,  however,  in Eastern 
Europe  and the USSR, where  much  more  wheat  is fed to animals  than in 
the other  developed  economies.  For less developed  countries  as a group, 
wheat  consumption,  although  remaining  low, rose a strong  20 percent  per 
capita  during  the period. 
The  third  price  explosion  has occurred  in oilseed  and  fishmeal  products. 
Here  again  much  of the explanation  appears  to be the influence  of affluence 
-as  much  as the widely  discussed  decline  in the Peruvian  anchovy  catch. 
In developed  countries  livestock  production  relies on the use of protein 
concentrates  and the two have risen together.  While U.S. domestic  con- 
sumption of these protein feeds has grown slowly, exports to  Japan, 
Western  Europe,  and Eastern  Europe  have expanded  rapidly.  Unlike the 
situation  in other  grain  crops,  there  is no large-scale  stockholding  for oil- 
seeds so that production  and consumption  generally  balance. In some 
years, however,  both the U.S. government  and private  trade have held 
soybean  stocks into the new crop, although  generally  in small amounts 
relative  to production  and usage. 
Total  oilseed  and  fishmeal  production  in the  world  rose  by 3 million  tons, 
or 5 percent,  from 1972  to 1973,  despite  the decline  of nearly  2 million  tons 
in Peruvian  fishmeal  exports.  Obviously,  this decline  put pressure  on U.S. 
supplies;  but a significant  push also came from the heightened  demand 
from Japan,  Western  Europe,  Eastern  Europe,  and the richer  Asian  coun- 
tries  spurred  by rising  affluence,  rather  than from deterioration  in supply. 
The final  explosion  in grain  prices  occurred  in rice, the staple  food for 
most of Asia's  population.  Normally,  very  little  rice  moves  in international 
trade  (Table  8); the two largest  exporters  are the United States  and Thai- 
land. In any case, the rise in rice prices  did not affect U.S. food prices 
directly,  except that the 1972-73 drop in world rice output called for 
heavier  U.S. exports  of wheat  and coarse  grains  as substitutes. 94  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Thus, the source  of much of the expanding  demand  for coarse  grains, 
oilseeds,  and to some extent,  rice, is a rising affluence  that supports  the 
demand  for better  diets.  How that  demand  manifests  itself  depends  in part 
upon the state of economic  development.  In the poorer  countries  it takes 
the form of demand  for more grains  for direct  consumption;  the richer 
countries  demand  more  feed grains  and protein  concentrates. 
THE RETURN OF MALTHUS 
Another  thesis  invokes  the Malthusian  theory  that population  tends  to 
outrun  food supply as an explanatory  factor in the recent shift in food 
prices.  According  to this  argument,  food supply  cannot  keep  up with  grow- 
ing population  and demand,  despite  the promise  of the Green  Revolution. 
In order  to avoid  widespread  famine,  the poor  countries  have  been  turning 
to the developed  countries,  especially  the United States,  for food grains, 
thus raising  world  demand  in relation  to supply. 
On the average,  the long-term  trend in world food production  is not 
alarming.  Over the last two decades,  world agricultural  production  has 
increased  at a fairly  steady  rate  of about 3/4 of 1 percent  per  capita  per  year. 
But the increases  have not been evenly  distributed,  averaging  11/2  percent 
per  capita  per  year  in developed  countries  and  less than  1/2 of 1 percent  per 
year  in developing  countries.  The former  may meet  the needs  of affluence, 
but the latter  is plainly  insufficient  in the face of some growth  in income. 
A count  of the developing  countries  where  food production  over  the period 
1953-71  failed  to keep pace with food demand  shows thirteen  of twenty- 
three  countries  in Latin  America;  twelve  of seventeen  countries  in the Near 
East  and  Northwest  Africa;  fourteen  of thirty-six  countries  in Africa  south 
of the  Sahara;  and  eight  of fifteen  countries  in the  Far  East,  including  India, 
Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  Thailand  (a traditional  exporter),  and  Korea  (where 
high economic  growth  rates  have greatly  stimulated  per capita demand). 
And these  figures  do not include  China,  which  has recently  entered  inter- 
national  markets  in a major  way as a net importer.  This situation  is re- 
flected  in the marked  changes  in the pattern  of world grain  trade  (Table 
12):  three  decades  ago, the less developed  countries  were  net exporters  of 
grains  to the advanced  economies;  now, increasingly,  they are becoming 
net importers,  and thus more heavily  dependent  on North America  and 
Oceania. 
Population  and growth  pressures  on food demand  are currently  inter- 
acting  with the adverse  effects  of the energy  shortage  on food supplies.  It Dale E. Hathaway  95 
Table 12. The Changing  World Pattern of Net Grain Exports (+) 
and Imports (-),  by Region, Selected Fiscal Years, 1934-73 
Millions of metric  tons 
Annual  average 
Region  1934-38  1948-52  1960  1966  1973p 
North America  +5  +23  +39  +59  +88 
Western  Europe  -24  -22  -25  -27  -21 
Australia  and 
New Zealand  +3  +3  +6  +8  +7 
Eastern  Europe 
and USSR  +5  n.a.  0  -4  -27 
Africa  +1  0  -2  -7  -4 
Asia  +2  -6  -17  -34  -39 
Latin America  +9  +1  0  +5  -4 
Sources: Lester Brown, Overseas Development Council, and U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
p Preliminary. 
n.a. Not available. 
also is a sad but important fact that both agriculture  in developed countries 
and the Green Revolution rely on high-energy technology; and, therefore, 
the level and cost of additional farm output everywhere  will depend in part 
upon the cost and availability of petroleum, fertilizers, and pesticides. In- 
deed, the cost and shortage of fuel and fertilizers already show signs of 
markedly reducing crop output in some of the developing countries.14 
THE CAUSES  IN  RETROSPECT 
The various explanations of the current crisis embody a combination of 
factors that culminated in a "flash point" in world grain prices. First, and 
in my view, most important, has been the long-run growth in demand for 
feed grains and oilseeds resulting from the spreading affluence in both the 
developed and developing world. Its impact began to  manifest itself in 
the late 1960s but was largely ignored in policy analyses. The second im- 
portant factor has been the prolonged failure of the LDCs,  despite the 
Green Revolution, to increase output of food  grain at rates sufficient to 
meet the new demands arising from both population and income growth. 
14. Herdt and Barker  estimate  the possible decline  in 1974  in Asian rice production 
(excluding  that in the People's Republic of China) due to fertilizer  shortages  at 1 to 3 
percent,  or 3 million  to 9 million  tons of paddy.  Robert W. Herdt  and Randolph  Barker, 
"The Rice Situation, 1973-74" (Los Bafios, Philippines:  International  Rice Research 
Institute,  no date; processed),  pp. 6, 12. 96  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
The final factor was the bad weather in 1972-73, a short-run episode that 
reflects a recurring  problem in agriculture. 
The U.S. sales to Russia were not, in my opinion, the major cause of the 
price explosion either in the United States or in the rest of the world. Once 
the USSR  decided to buy grains, where they purchased them could not 
have made much difference to world market conditions, although it made 
a lot of difference to U.S.  taxpayers and to the Russian Ministry of Fi- 
nance. In essence, the flash point  was reached because the  spark of  a 
short-run, weather-induced decline in supply ignited a volatile long-run 
situation created by persistently growing demand and lagging supplies. 
The flash point came when the excess of world demand over supply drew 
down stocks, especially in the major grain-exporting  countries, to a level so 
low that they could no longer absorb any significant shock in the world 
production system. In other words, the key elements were the obsession of 
the developed country exporters with the high carrying costs and market- 
depressing  effects of major reserve stocks; and the failures to recognize the 
steadily growing world demand for grains, to reevaluate the stocks neces- 
sary to absorb shocks in world output, and to consider the potential price 
implications of inadequate stocks. These all promoted a dangerous policy 
of stock reduction that had inevitably to lead, sooner or later, to events like 
those of the past two years. Hindsight suggests that competent analysis- 
by the FAO,  the USDA,  or even some college professors-would  have 
revealed as early as 1970 the need for a shift by major exporters away from 
output controls toward controlled output expansion. Instead, surpluses, 
market shares, and downward adjustment of production obsessed almost 
every policy maker and farmer.'5 More land was retired from production 
in the United States in 1972 (62 million acres compared with 37 million the 
year before), reducing grain acreage (Table 4); and the programs actually 
continued  into  1973, with  nearly 20  million  acres  withheld  after  the 
Russian sales and crop failures of 1972. 
As a final step in documenting this ill-focused policy, Figure 1 demon- 
strates  both when shifts in the prices of U.S. farm products began and how 
they were, indeed, completely unrelated to the events usually cited as the 
15. In November 1973, the Seventeenth  Annual Conference  of the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization  of the United Nations had agricultural  adjustment  (downward) 
as a major  item on its agenda.  Not surprisingly,  it received  little discussion.  FAO, Report 
of the Conference  of FAO, Seventeenth  Session, November  1973 (Rome: FAO, 1973), 
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cause of the problem. The indexes of prices received by farmers for all 
farm products, livestock and products, and all crops, depicted in the figure, 
show the postwar decline that persisted until the late 1950s, with excess 
capacity in U.S.  agriculture and gradually lowered price supports. The 
figure also reveals the extreme stability in prices for crops, mainly grains, 
throughout the 1960s,  jiggled by the cyclical movements in livestock prices. 
But the shift really began in the late sixties. With supplies lagging, im- 
provement in income put increasing pressure on meat and poultry prices 
beginning in 1968. This shift occurred before feed grain and soybean prices 
started to rise and before the corn blight of 1970 markedly reduced U.S. 
output. With U.S. feed grain stocks already cut to half their postwar high, 
the short 1970 corn crop further destabilized the livestock industry and 
reduced incentives to expand output, so that livestock prices piled a 16 per- 
cent rise from 1971 to 1972 on top of the 12 percent rise that had occurred 
from 1968 to 1969 (Figure 1). 
Grain stocks played a key role in stabilizing crop prices until 1972. In 
six  of  the nine years from  1960 to  1968, world grain output  exceeded 
world disappearance. In three of the next four years (the exception was 
1971) world grain disappearance exceeded production. Thus, the world 
depended  upon  stocks  for  part  of  current consumption  even  before 
the bad weather of 1972. The sharp decline in grain stocks as a percent of 
world consumption from 1969 to  1971 is evident in Figure 2. The decline 
in coarse grains was the most dramatic. Annual world disappearance in- 
creased on  average by  about  14 million tons  per year from  1961-62 to 
1971-72; world production outside the United States rose at an average 
rate of 11 million tons per year, while control programs aliowed U.S. out- 
put to  expand only about 6 million tons per year. Meanwhile, U.S.  ex- 
ports grew and, to the glee of U.S.  policy makers, U.S.  stocks declined 
sharply (Table 7). In the early 1960s, the nation held 80 percent of the 
world's coarse grain stocks, but the figure had falien to 52 percent by 1971. 
Stocks outside the United  States meanwhile rose only modestly. World 
coarse grain stocks as a proportion of world disappearance fell irregularly 
but steadily from 24 percent to  the current 10 percent. Even so, coarse 
grain prices were virtualiy stable to mid- or late 1972. Only after the world 
markets realized that total output of coarse grains had declined 15.8 mil- 
lion tons from the previous year and that world stocks were down so low 
did grain prices start to skyrocket. 
In one sense, then, the United States, as the world's largest coarse grain Dale E. Hathaway  99 
Figure 2.  World Production  and Consumption  of Grain, 
and Stocks as Percentage of Consumption,  Annually, 1960-74a 
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exporter, set  itself  and  the  world  up  for  the  situation  that  developed 
in late 1972 and 1973. A 3 percent decline in world output partialiy attrib- 
utable to U.S. production control programs,  combined with low stocks and 
an already expanding demand pushed further  by devaluation, set off a wild 
scramble for coarse grains. The price of corn at the farm level in November 
1972-well  after the Russian purchases and the shortfall due to the Asian 
drought were known-was  $1.20 per bushel or $47.24 per ton. By August 
1973, it had risen to $2.68 per bushel or $105.51 per ton, and by November 
1973 it was still $2.18 per bushel or $85.82 per ton-nearly  twice the year- 
earlier level-despite  a U.S. harvest up 10 miliion tons and a world harvest 
up an estimated 8 percent. The rise continued into early 1974 as stocks 
fell to pipeline levels and importers realized that supplies hinged entirely 
on current output. 
For some products, such as poultry, meat, and eggs, the supply response 
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and  protein supplements rise, producers watch their profits melt  into 
losses. They then restrict output and, with a constant or rising demand, 
bring on sharp rises in both farm and retail prices. For hog producers, 
cattle feeders, and dairy producers, the adjustment process is slower, and 
thus much of it is yet to come. In the first case, the number of sows bred 
falls, the number of pigs fed subsequently declines, and finally the retail 
market price rises enough to  make raising and feeding pigs profitable. 
Cattle producers react stili more slowly. Those with steers on feed take 
their financial beating when feed costs exceed the margin they can obtain 
from feeding cattle to slaughter weights. But, having disposed of those on 
feed, they feed fewer or none at all until the market price for finished cattle 
rises enough to cover the cost of cattle and the higher feed cost. 
In the dairy industry the adjustment is fairly rapid under the conditions 
that prevailed in 1973. First, the industry cut back on expensive protein 
concentrates and feed grains and substituted grass and hay. Production 
per cow stabilized or declined. Second, marginal animals and herds were 
sold for slaughter to take advantage of extremely favorable beef prices; 
some dairy farmers, for the first time in a decade, were able to liquidate 
their businesses profitably and to prosper merely by raising and selling the 
feed stuffs they otherwise would have fed to their cows. The decline in the 
number of dairy cows that had persisted for two decades steepened in 1973, 
and  the  milk  production per cow  declined for  the  first time  in  three 
decades. Total milk production for each month in  1973 was below that 
of  1972 and the rate of  decline worsened steadily, from  1.4 percent in 
January  to 5.8 percent  in September.16  As in beef and pork, the adjustment 
of  dairy products to  the higher prices of  feed grains and protein con- 
centrates is not over. 
Thus, affluence, combined with a policy that maintained controls too 
long  and allowed government stocks to  be depleted and with a modest 
decline in world output of coarse grains, has set in motion an inflationary 
feed-livestock price cycle that wili run through 1974 and into 1975. 
While bread does  not  loom  large in the  American housewife's food 
budget, its cost arouses emotions like nothing else, as Marie Antoinette 
vividly testified. The spokesman for the baking industry who announced in 
January 1974  that the price of a loaf of bread could reach $1 by midsummer 
and demanded export controls on wheat drew national news coverage and a 
16. U.S. Department  of Agriculture,  Economic Research  Service, Dairy Situation, 
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sharp denial from the Secretary of Agriculture. Actualiy, wheat prices did 
respond to the announcement of the massive Russian wheat sales and the 
drought in Asia by almost doubling from July to  December 1972. But, 
even after the Russian sales were known in August, the USDA did not take 
prompt action to encourage all-out winter wheat production in 1973, even 
though they had another month before planting to  do so,  nor did they 
remove all controls on spring wheat actually planted six months later!17  By 
the end of the 1973 crop year, world wheat stocks were the lowest in two 
decades. As a result, wheat prices doubled again by December 1973 and 
rose even further during early 1974 despite an increase of 27 million tons 
in world wheat production estimated for 1973-74, including 5 million tons 
in the United States and a record crop in the USSR. One can attribute the 
1973 price rise at least in part to the Russian purchases and the decline 
in world wheat production in 1972-73 of approximately 2 percent. Added 
to this pressure  was the demand for food grains from Asia, where rice and 
coarse  grain crops were adversely affected by  weather in  1972. While 
world exports thus rose 17 million tons, or 30 percent, from the previous 
year, the rise amounted to  only  5 percent of  the previous year's con- 
sumption.  But  from  1962-63  to  1963-64  wheat  exports  rose  by  12.6 
million tons, also 5 percent of the previous year's world disappearance. 
Thus, instability in wheat exports alone does not account for the striking 
price rise from 1972 to 1974. The difference  between these two periods lies 
in the ratio of world stocks of wheat to exports. In 1962-63 this ratio was 
1.3 and the ratio of  U.S.  stocks to  exports was 0.8.  For  1973-74,  the 
world ratio of  stocks to  exports is estimated as 0.6  and the U.S.  ratio 
as 0.2 (Table 6). 
Approximately the same situation was occurring for coarse grains, as the 
ratio of world stocks to  exports fell  below  1 in  1973-74,  from  2.5  in 
1962-63. At  the same time the United  States, which had maintained a 
stocks-export ratio of 1 or higher from 1961 to 1965, saw that ratio decline 
to  about 0.4 in  1973-74, and to  an estimated 0.3  entering the  1974-75 
crop year. 
In a sense the world set itself up for the present precarious situation by 
continuing to  depend on  the United  States as the world's grain stock- 
holder while ignoring changes in U.S.  policy. And the United States col- 
17. For a discussion of the details of the administration's  policy actions and their 
import see John Schnittker,  "The 1972-73 Food Price Spiral," Brookings  Papers on 
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laborated  by steadfastly  insisting  that even reasonable  publicly  held re- 
serves  were  not in the interest  of the nation's  farmers  or of its consumers. 
The fixation  on overcapacity,  surpluses,  and exports  at any cost, and the 
dependence  on free  enterprise  to hold sufficient  reserves,  blinded  analysts 
and  policy  makers  to the  potential-and now apparent-effects  of affluence 
and crop failures  on domestic  and world  food prices.  Thus, these  failures 
have spawned  the whirlwind  of inflation,  shortages,  and possible mass 
starvation  if crops  fali seriously  short  in 1974  or in 1975. 
Looking  Ahead:  Short-run  Problems  and  Strategies 
Economic  analysis  is always  better  looking  backward  than  ahead,  but in 
the current  situation,  only political office  seekers  are much interested  in 
affixing  blame.  In retrospect,  it is fairly  clear  that  the United  States  should 
have relaxed  production  restraints  on feed grains in  1972 rather  than 
tighten  them,  and eased  wheat  restraints  in 1972  and spurred  all-out  pro- 
duction  in 1973.  But it did not, and as a result,  a world  food shortage  has 
developed  that  has contributed  to a serious  domestic  and worldwide  infla- 
tionary  spiral.  Errors  in analysis  and policies  did not create  bad weather, 
but clearly  no effort  was  made  to insulate  the nation  or the world  from  its 
effects  when  it came on top of the steady  growth  in world  demand. 
Having exhausted  reserve  resources  of idle land and surplus  labor on 
commercial  farms,  the United States is now reduced  to "a wing and a 
prayer"  for the next  year  or two. The wing  is the ability  of farmers  around 
the world to expand  output by intensifying  resource  utilization  and im- 
proving  productivity;  and the prayer  is that adverse  weather  and other 
events  do not seriously  curtail  food output  in major  consuming  countries 
and exert  further  pressure  on the meager  available  supplies.  Unless and 
until world  stocks of wheat  and coarse  grains  can be rebuilt,  food prices 
cannot  ease  significantly;  and for several  reasons,  many  food products  will 
probably  become  more  expensive  before  that occurs. 
The  wing  of sharply  increased  output  has  been  clipped  by the worldwide 
shortage  of fertilizers  and  the shortage  of fuel  in some  countries.  Moreover, 
because  both have a petroleum  base, their prices have risen severalfold 
since the fall of 1973.  Agricultural  production  in developed  countries  is 
energy  intensive,  and so are  the practices  associated  with  the high-yielding 
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Every nation seems to be giving agriculture priority in fuel allocation, 
and the industry statistics indicate that the total quantity of fertilizer  avail- 
able in the world will be greater  in 1974 than in 1973. But the distribution 
will be uneven. Supplies of fertilizer in the United  States, Canada, and 
Western Europe are reported to be up somewhat in 1974, but this increase 
is coming largely from decreased exports by the developed countries to 
the LDCs, especially those in Asia. This imbalance may raise some major 
policy issues for the United States. 
Estimates made in April 1974 indicate that the United States will harvest 
record crops of wheat and feed grains, although the latter is far from certain 
until the end of summer. Even if these forecasts are realized, total avail- 
ability will be no greater than in  1973 because of the depletion of U.S. 
stocks. And the same will be true in total for the four major grain-exporting 
nations. There is little probability of any significant stock building because 
shortages and price increases in fertilizer and fuel are likely to reduce the 
output of food grains in the LDCs even if the weather is good. 
This situation has already hit India. The shortages of fuel and fertilizer, 
together with adverse weather, have already lowered estimates of the winter 
grain crop to the extent that India has approached the United States for 
concessionary food imports in 1974-75 and has entered commercial mar- 
kets as well.18  Recent reports put the 1973-74 output of Indian food grain 8 
million to 10 million tons below the goal whose achievement was necessary 
to maintain even current low consumption without additional imports or 
higher prices. 
The tightness of the global situation can be seen by comparing the opti- 
mistic USDA  projections of world grain output for the 1974-75 crop year 
with the estimated world disappearance reported in Table 5 (using the 
average annual increase over the last decade). As of mid-March the USDA 
projected world wheat output of 375 million tons, an increase of 8 million 
tons over 1973-74. It estimated an increase of 10 million tons in the United 
States, an increase of 2 million tons in Canada, and, by implication, a net 
decrease in the rest of the world. If this optimistic estimate is achieved, the 
exporting nations might increase stocks slightly, but only if demand else- 
where allows. Even under the USDA estimates of production and demand, 
U.S. stocks at the end of the year will remain at unusually low levels. 
Much the  same situation holds  for coarse grains. In mid-March the 
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USDAprojected a rise in world output of more than 20 million tons, enough 
so that with normal consumption increases, world stocks would rise mod- 
estly over the coming year. But, again most of the gain is expected in North 
America and any stock building, if it occurs, will be in the major exporting 
countries. 
These optimistic forecasts for wheat and coarse grains could easily be 
confounded by the expected decline in world rice production, largely due to 
fertilizer  shortages. If, as some suggest, the rice shortfall is 9 million tons, 
it would more than offset the expected increase in wheat stocks. Thus, one 
can predict  that, with good weather,  world grain output will be either slightly 
above or slightly below world consumption, and that practically all of the 
increase in output will occur in the United  States and the other major 
grain-exporting  countries. Virtually all of the world's rice and a major por- 
tion of its coarse grain output in 1974 still depend upon the weather, upon 
the availability of fertilizer,  and upon adequate supplies of fuel for harvest- 
ing and drying in the developed countries. Thus, whether world stocks are 
slightly rebuilt in 1974-75 or are depleted further is far from certain. The 
answer lies in events and policies yet to unfold. 
This uncertainty brings the United States to the first policy dilemma it 
may face. Suppose the expected record output of the United States is real- 
ized in 1974, which, if export demand remains unchanged, would stabilize 
or even lower domestic prices. In that event, will the United States continue 
its policy of unrestricted  exports? Or will it, by some device, restrict  exports 
enough to stabilize or moderately reduce grain prices to avoid further  infla- 
tion in prices of livestock products? This issue could be forced merely by 
the continued growth in domestic and world demand due to affluence and 
population growth, without assuming deep shortfalls in crops elsewhere  in 
the world. 
A more frightening  policy dilemma is implied by a more pessimistic view. 
Suppose that, in addition to the shortfall caused by inadequate supplies of 
fertilizers, moderate to severe weather problems afflict heavily populated 
parts of the world, including Asia and the USSR, an event that could easily 
reduce world output by 20 million tons  or more. Then, will the United 
States allow free exports or even divert substantial quantities of feed grains 
under special terms to avert food shortages abroad if it means pushing its 
own feed grain and livestock prices up further? 
One factor might ameliorate the situation. If high oil prices persist, the 
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developed  importing  countries  might  reduce  consumer  demand  for grain- 
intensive  livestock  products  and thus the demand  for food grain  imports. 
There is as yet no evidence  of such a development,  and it seems likely 
that political  pressures  will lend  top priority  to imports  of food and food- 
related  products  in most countries,  rich  and poor. 
In any case, continued  inflation  in food prices  through  1974 and into 
1975  is almost  inevitable.  Its magnitude,  rate,  and  duration  rest  heavily  on 
the weather  and on the capacity  of farmers  to respond  to the highly  favor- 
able price incentives.  Whether  the United States and other major  food- 
producing  nations  share  this  burden  or limit  their  exports  to avoid  it is up 
to their  policy  makers.  It would,  however,  take  exceptional  courage  for the 
United States deliberately  to restrict  exports to control domestic  food 
prices in the face of urgent  world demand  for additional  food. And a 
nation that has relentlessly  pursued  agricultural  export  markets  for two 
decades  would  find  it doubly  hard  suddenly  to abandon  customers  whose 
dependence  it has so vigorously  solicited. 
Looking  Ahead:  Longer-run  Issues 
While  short-run  price  forecasting  for farm  products  is risky,  these  risks 
are small compared  with those of longer-run  forecasts.  Nonetheless,  the 
five-year  forecast  can hardly  miss  by more  than  did recent  short-term  pre- 
dictions.  In part, however,  the realization  of the longer-run  forecast  will 
depend  on events  in late 1974  and early 1975. 
THE LONGER-RUN  SUPPLY  PRICE OF FOOD 
One  of the  major  factors  in determining  prices  of U.S. farm  products  and 
food is the long-run  supply  price of food grains  and livestock  products. 
The large, inexpensive  means of expanding  grain output in the United 
States  and other  developed  countries-idle farm  land of reasonable  quality 
-will  be exhausted  in 1974.  The variable  costs of producing  crops have 
gone  up sharply  in the  United  States  along  with  the costs of fuel,  fertilizers, 
herbicides,  and farm machinery.  Prices  paid by farmers  for production 
items were 46 percent  higher  in 1973  than in 1967;  most of the advance 
came  in 1972  and 1973.  In March  1974,  interest,  taxes,  and wages  were  61 
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half; fertilizer  and fuel prices had doubled in the previous year. These costs 
mean that any expansion in output will carry a higher price; but how much 
higher relative to the late 1960s is uncertain. Moreover, other than interest, 
none of these costs is likely to decline appreciably; in all probability, in 
fact, all will increase more during 1974 and 1975. 
Although economic analysis views land prices as price-determined  rather 
than price-determining,  they can establish the level of farm prices at which 
farmers will get into trouble and push for government intervention. Land 
prices  have risen sharply  in the past two years, and a collapse in them would 
bring screams that would resound through the political process. 
All in all, U.S. crop prices may have to be nearly double those of 1971 in 
order to protect commercial farmers from severe economic problems. In 
other words, while wheat need not be $5.00 per bushel nor corn $3.50 to 
cover the variable costs of crop production, prices must be at or above the 
target prices established in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act, 
passed in August 1973 ($2.28 for wheat and $1.53 for corn in 1974, adjusted 
for changes in costs of production in subsequent  years). Since the prices paid 
by farmers  have gone up 12 percent between July 1973 and April 1974  and 
are likely to rise by a similar proportion during the rest of 1974, this means 
that the target prices per bushel for the 1975 crops will be close to $3 for 
wheat and to $2 for corn. Moreover, the 1973 act makes it less expensive 
to the government to hold market prices at or above the target levels than 
to make direct payments to farmers if prices fall appreciably below the 
targets. Both legislation and the rising costs spawned by nonfarm inflation 
reinforce expectations that the real cost of feed grains will remain above its 
level of the 1960s and the early 1970s; the current-dollar  costs are likely to 
continue to rise with nonfarm price increases, since the target prices are 
tied directly to production costs. 
For livestock products, consumer prices will reflect the higher costs of 
grain and of capital and labor. Labor is especially important inasmuch as 
an expansion of pork and dairy production will require more of it; and, if 
excess labor is indeed no longer available on commercial farms, high-cost 
labor and capital will have to be attracted to livestock production. Thus, 
the spreads  between feed prices and livestock prices will have to widen even 
more than they have since 1969. Even if grain prices should fall off appre- 
ciably from their early 1974 levels to the targets of the 1973 farm legisla- 
tion, prices of livestock products would stabilize at or above the current 
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livestock production will call for prices of about $40 per cwt. for hogs and 
over $10 per cwt. for fluid milk, considerably above the prices farmers re- 
ceived in mid-March 1974. 
The final factor determining  retail food prices is marketing costs, which 
account for more than half of the housewife's food budget. As of mid-1974, 
retail prices  have not fully incorporated recent rises in marketing  and trans- 
portation costs. And further cost increases-indeed,  large ones-will  take 
place as labor contracts are renewed. Any decline in farm price levels is 
therefore likely to be swallowed by increased wholesale and retail costs, 
affording consumers little if any relief. 
Food prices have contributed heavily to inflation in the past two years; 
but inflation in turn will maintain or raise food  costs  for some period 
ahead. The temporary burst in farm prices to levels above long-run supply 
prices probably raises the long-run supply price at which equilibrium wili 
finally be reached. The recent inflation will be reflected  in higher production 
costs for farmers, thus introducing a ratchet effect into this cost structure. 
Moreover, since the higher crop prices are being bid into land prices, there 
will be irresistible  political pressure  to maintain farm prices at levels neces- 
sary to sustain both asset values and market returns on other resources- 
even if it means resort to land-retirement  programs from time to time over 
the next few years. 
Thus, while the supply price of U.S. farm products has been moving to 
a new and higher equilibrium since about 1969, the level of that new equi- 
librium will be raised by the events of 1972-74, and it could be pushed even 
higher if serious inflation in food prices persists into 1975. The U.S.  con- 
sumer will continue to pay for the problems of 1972-74. 
THE LONGER-RUN  DEMAND  FOR FOOD 
An equally difficult question is the long-run prospect for demand. The 
recent shift in world petroleum prices may affect the growth rates of devel- 
oped countries. In the short run, growth may be reduced and further cur- 
rency adjustments required. But, after the initial adjustment, the growth of 
the developed economies will likely be resumed, bringing with it the greater 
demand for animal products, and thus for feed grains and protein concen- 
trates, that their high income elasticities for these products imply. 
A more vexing problem is the developing countries, where population is 
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diets and famine is razor thin. These countries potentially need much bigger 
food supplies. Only a few have oil or other valuable natural resources to 
export; a few more, like Korea and Taiwan, have successfully fostered in- 
dustrial growth. The rest do not have the foreign exchange to meet their 
food-importing needs. Nor  are they likely to benefit from a large-scale, 
continuous program of food aid, since, for political and economic reasons, 
neither the United States nor other developed countries are likely again to 
embark  upon one. Thus, they will require greater  internal effort and greater 
technical assistance than ever before to develop better and more productive 
farming, which makes fuller use of the available land, labor, and water 
supplies and which depends less on energy-intensive  methods for increased 
yields. 
Even if that difficult task can be accomplished, major policy issues con- 
front the United States and other advanced food-surplus countries. The 
question is whether some kind of public national or international food re- 
serve should be held against the violent price fluctuations arising from the 
deep declines in supply that so adversely affect both producers and con- 
sumers. 
Several proposals for such emergency reserves  have been put forth both 
in international forums and in the United  States. On March 21,  1974, 
in testimony before a Senate subcommittee, Secretary of Agriculture Earl 
Butz opposed (1) the return  to stockholding by the U.S. government,  (2) an 
internationally held and managed stock program, and (3) authority for 
export controls to deal with sudden spurts in foreign demand of the type 
experienced over the past two years. He also reaffirmed  his implicit faith in 
the ability of a free market economy to deal with the problems of food pro- 
duction and price instability: 
Finally,  government-managed  reserves  are not consistent  with an incentive  econ- 
omy. On the other  hand  government-held  and government-manipulated  reserves 
are consistent  with the government  supply-management  approach  to agriculture 
-which  is short-sighted,  restrictive,  and higher  cost.... 
We need to get over the idea that there is something  evil about reasonable 
rises and falls in food supplies  and prices.'9 
Secretary  Butz appears to take a position inconsistent with both the eco- 
nomic analysis and the policy position  of most agricultural economists, 
19. "Statemenit  by Secretary  of Agriculture  Earl  L. Butz before  the Subcommittee  on 
Agricultural  Production,  Marketing  and Stabilization  of Prices  of the Senate  Committee 
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including some in his own department.  A long-accepted tenet in the theory 
of production economics holds that risk and uncertainty  in agriculture  are 
major deterrents  to expansion of output. Indeed, they result in higher aver- 
age costs and lower output because they induce capital rationing and other 
costly actions to achieve greater  flexibility  in the face of large price changes. 
As  some USDA  economists have put it:  "It seems that low-priced feed 
rather than high and unstable [sic] priced feed may be conducive to steady 
growth in livestock and poultry production."20 
Since marked instability in farm prices is conducive neither to increased 
output nor to stable domestic or international prices, and since, further- 
more, it can intensify general inflationary pressure, the administration's 
current  position is unlikely to satisfy politicians, economists, or consumers. 
As  the  world's most  productive agricultural economy  and the  world's 
largest exporter, the United States must not disrupt the world food scene. 
It must instead play a leading role in organizing some kind of food reserve 
system, both to facilitate trade and to combat emergencies. Not to do so is 
to invite other periods like 1972-73, interspersed with years of tumbling 
farm prices and heavy burdens of government income supports. 
20. "Feed Grain Outlook for 1973-74," USDA, Economic Research Service,  Feed 
Situation,  FdS-252  (February  1974),  p. 7. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Hendrik S.  Houthakker: Agricultural problems have  preoccupied eco- 
nomic policy makers for a long time. These problems are far from solved 
at an analytical level, but the main difficulties lie in political barriers to 
rational policy formulation. The agriculture committees of Congress tend 
to take a parochial and short-run view of farm problems, and any secretary 
of agriculture  feels responsible primarily for keeping farmers happy. Con- 
sumers are thus put at the back of the line. 
Basically, I agree with Hathaway's thesis that overcapacity in agriculture 
ended some years ago. While he dates the end at 1970, I would place it 
somewhat earlier-perhaps  in 1966, when the Indian monsoon failed and 
U.S.  agricultural exports grew temporarily. At that time, many spoke of 
the responsibility of the United States for feeding the poor nations, but the 
Green Revolution at least postponed that issue. From 1967 to 1970, grain 
inventories were approximately normal. But even after the surpluses were 
worked off and stocks depleted to levels too low for comfort, much of the 
American  public and the Congress  remained obsessed with the dangers  of an 
oversupply of food.  As Hathaway correctly points out, the shrinkage of 
inventories seems to  be  the major reason for the agricultural price ex- 
plosion of 1972-73. 
In assessing the long-run outlook, I see ample reason for concern about 
agriculture,  even though the concern that arose in some previous episodes, 
like that of  1966, turned out to be unjustified. Indeed, I believe that the 
agricultural problem of the next decade is more serious than the energy 
problem. Hathaway's discussion of the relatively high income elasticities 
for some products, red meat in particular, illuminates the nature of these 
forthcoming problems. They have obvious implications for feed grains, 
which Hathaway emphasized, and also  for oilseeds, which may deserve 
more stress than he gave them. 
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Evidence on supply elasticity would also be helpful for this long-run 
appraisal. Indeed, I would encourage agricultural economists to  devote 
more attention to the investigation of supply elasticity. It requires detailed 
knowledge of the conditions for producing various crops and livestock, and 
therefore  defies the skills and expertise of a non-agricultural  economist. As 
Hathaway points out, for the first time in decades the United States seems 
to be using its full supply of land. But I wonder what effect proper incen- 
tives would have in drawing out now hidden supplies of land. Hathaway 
seems to feel that labor could become a limiting factor in any expansion of 
land usage, as it may already be in livestock production. In my amateur 
judgment, I suspect that surplus labor is still present in some branches of 
livestock production, and is kept there by various government policies. 
For example, dairy production operates under a host of restrictions. Re- 
strictions on foreign imports prevent healthy competition that might en- 
courage improved efficiency in dairying. Moreover, the notion of "foreign 
milk" extends to interstate commerce. An important case in Massachusetts 
now deals with access of New York milk to the market in that state. Given 
the removal of such restrictions, the dairy industry may be capable of much 
greater  efficiency  than it has achieved. These clues encourage me to believe 
that some scope exists for conserving labor through increased efficiency. 
They also raise broader questions about possible improvements in agri- 
cultural policy. As Hathaway suggests, the failures of policy in recent years 
have been colossal. It was nothing short of scandalous that the government 
imposed crop restrictions in  1972, when a  serious problem was clearly 
emerging  in grains. 
One important question about the  future concerns the effects of  the 
Agriculture Act  of 1973. Hathaway suggests that the target prices in that 
act may be unreasonably low and therefore obsolete. Although I agree that 
that is a possibility, I would not yet take it for granted. Agricultural prices 
have been falling significantly in the last few months and they may come 
down to levels that will make the target prices once again relevant. 
A second important question concerns the future role of export controls, 
such as those put into effect on soybeans in 1973. The basic issue is whether 
the United States should serve as a supplier of last resort for the whole 
world. I'm inclined to answer that question affirmatively.  This country has 
a comparative advantage in agricultural  production, and we gain along with 
the rest of the world when we trade heavily in farm products. Flirting with 
export limitations encourages other nations to strengthen their own agri- 112  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
cultural industries in an effort to achieve greater self-sufficiency.  I believe 
we should take a more definitely  negative position on controls. 
The  final key  policy  issue,  which  Hathaway  stresses, concerns  the 
holding of inventories. Private traders once held sizable stocks, but when 
that function was taken over by the government during the thirties, they 
more or less lost the habit. Even if they could easily regain it, I would agree 
with  Hathaway that  this  function cannot  be  entrusted entirely to  the 
private trade; it requires some degree of government involvement. Stock- 
holding by the private trade tends to be insufficient, because the risks are 
great and the required rate of  return very high.  In  particular, private 
traders cannot be expected to hold inventories over the long periods be- 
tween large-scale shortages, which emerge on average about once every 
five years, but with considerable irregularity. Still, the government's in- 
volvement should take the least disruptive form possible and this argues 
against major acquisition of  physical inventories. For  one  thing,  once 
stocks are acquired, any attempt to reduce them encounters severe protests 
from farmers.  One possible approach, which I suggested several years ago, 
works  through  government intervention in  the  futures markets.'  The 
government would  acquire futures contracts whenever their prices fell 
below some specified level, and it would sell its contracts whenever those 
prices rose above some specified higher level. In between the two specified 
prices, the government would hold its shares for the length of the contract. 
Because it would be dealing in futures, the rollover would be automatic 
and the issue of depleting stocks would not  arise. The basic purpose of 
this operation would be to  make hedging cheaper to  private inventory 
holders, thereby providing them an incentive to build up their stocks. I 
believe that Hathaway has done a useful service in calling attention to the 
importance of developing a sound inventory policy. 
John A. Schnittker: I agree wholeheartedly with Dale Hathaway that we 
are in an extremely precarious position with respect to agricultural com- 
modities. As just one example of this instability, wheat prices soared to 
$6.45 per bushel in late February 1974 in response to the release of official 
estimates of grain stocks that ran 2 million or 3 million tons below the 
levels expected by the market. 
I  think that Hathaway puts too  much  of  the blame for the current 
1. Editors'  note: See Hendrik  S. Houthakker,  Economic  Policy  for the Farm Sector 
(American  Enterprise  Institute,  1967). Dale E. Hathiaway  113 
problems  on the failure  of economists  to perceive  an imminent  danger  to 
world  food supplies.  In my  judgment,  many  of the factors  that  contributed 
to the recent "crisis"  were largely  unpredictable.  Crop failures  in the 
USSR, China,  and several  other  major  areas  provided  the greatest  shock 
to world grain  output  in over twenty  years.  The heavy purchases  of the 
Soviet  Union in the world  food market  to protect  its domestic  poultry  and 
livestock  production  were  a new  and  unforeseeable  response.  The Russians 
had entered  the world  market  before,  as Hathaway  reminds  us, but never 
for the purpose  of insulating  domestic  meat output  from the pressures  of 
a poor harvest.  As Hathaway  correctly  points  out, these  disruptions  were 
exacerbated  by the increased  world  demand  for grain,  emanating  from  the 
growing  demand  for livestock.  But that was a gradual  trend  and, until  the 
Russians  reversed  their  position  on meat  production,  it was  being  absorbed 
by the world  market. 
Finally,  I take  issue  with  both Hathaway  and  Houthakker  on the subject 
of world  food stocks.  As late as 1971,  the level of world  stocks of grain, 
held primarily  by the United States and Canada,  was high by historical 
standards  except  for the unusual  period  of the 1960s.  After  the U.S. corn 
blight  of 1970,  the adoption  of a policy of nearly  full production  created 
added  stocks in 1971.  At that point, no budget  director  would have au- 
thorized  the secretary  of agriculture  to encourage  full production  in 1972, 
as long as the holding  of surplus  stocks  constituted  a "burden  on the tax- 
payer."  However,  after the Russian  and Chinese  grain deals, failure  to 
expand  the acreage  under  cultivation  was inexcusable,  for the impact  of 
these  large-scale  transactions  on future  grain  supplies  was  readily  apparent 
at that time. 
The  United  States  needs  a food policy  as well  as a farm  policy.  The  basic 
component  of such  a program  should  be a stockpile  of basic  foodstuffs  such 
as feed grains,  wheat,  soybeans,  and dried  milk. A large  reserve  of agri- 
cultural  commodities  would benefit  the nation since it would enable us 
to service  our trading  partners  reliably,  thereby  ensuring  a more stable 
pattern  of trade.  Agricultural  reserves  would  also  lessen  the need  for export 
controls,  which  are an unpopular  means  of handling  the problem  of com- 
modity  inflation.  Congress  has shown  renewed  interest  in building  reserve 
stocks.  But the secretary  of agriculture  has strongly  opposed  them.  Fortu- 
nately,  the secretary  of state has expressed  interest  in a U.S. role in re- 
building  world  reserve  stocks. 
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sold to drive  down  market  prices.  But they  might  accept  a stocks  policy  if 
an agreement  were  made  to hold the stocks until  prices  were,  say, double 
the acquisition  price. Such a program  would provide  a margin  of safety 
to U.S. consumers  against terribly  high prices and would help other 
nations  to cope with severe  shortages. 
I noted  above  that  export  controls  should  be avoided  whenever  possible. 
But,  in the face of high  prices  for soybeans,  wheat,  and corn, I would  sug- 
gest their use again as I did last year. After a certain  point, the goal of 
domestic  price  stability  should  override  any obligation  to sell the Russians, 
Chinese,  and Japanese  all the food that they want-for  stock building  as 
well as consumption.  Export  licensing  early  in the crop year would have 
prevented  the major  instability  in grain  and oilseed  prices  we experienced 
in the past  year.  We can hope to avoid  resort  to such  measures  if we main- 
tain adequate  stockpiles  of basic foodstuffs. 
General Discussion 
Dale  Hathaway took  issue with a few points made by the discussants 
of his paper.  Responding  to Schnittker,  he stressed  that the adequacy  of 
stocks should be judged by their size relative to world consumption, and 
not in absolute  terms.  By the relative  standard,  the decline  after 1969  was 
pronounced. In response to  Houthakker, Hathaway expressed his  con- 
viction that estimates  of supply  elasticities  based on historical  experience 
would be extremely  unreliable,  given the major  changes  in the structure 
of the agricultural  economy. Furthermore,  he emphasized,  labor costs, 
rather  than  government  restrictions,  were,  in his  judgment,  the  major  inhib- 
itor of expansion  in dairying. 
Much of the discussion  focused  on issues  involving  agricultural  reserve 
stocks. Michael  Wachter  noted that, in a world where farm prices are 
expected  to have  an upward  trend  relative  to the general  price  level,  entre- 
preneurs  would  be eager  to hold food stocks.  However,  uncertainty  about 
the future role of government  in stockpiling  agricultural  commodities 
would serve  to discourage  private  activity  to build inventories.  Wachter 
and William Poole  observed that a clear statement of the intentions of 
agricultural policy in this area could be vital to private tradesmen. Paul 
Samuelson countered that it was unrealistic ever to expect certainty about 
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it could always change it. Poole noted that another force serving to limit 
private inventorying of farm commodities was the public disapproval of 
profits made under conditions of national distress. 
International organizations would be the proper authorities to engage 
in  public  stockholding of  grains and  other  commodities,  in  Nicholas 
Kaldor's view. As long as the responsibility for maintaining grain inven- 
tories rested on the United States, the expense of holding the stocks would 
mobilize public pressure  to reduce them to suboptimally low levels. Kaldor 
mentioned one proposal, which calls for the establishment of  an inter- 
national inventory of commodities that is tied to a reform of the inter- 
national monetary system and the issuance of a new international currency 
with commodity backing. 
Paul Samuelson was not convinced that recent agricultural  reserve  stocks 
have been lower than the levels that would  have been dictated by  an 
optimum control policy, given the pattern of information available. Ob- 
viously, in retrospect,  larger  stocks would have been desirable  for the partic- 
ular situation experienced in recent years, but that  does  not  prove that 
the benefits of more insurance necessarily would justify the costs in the 
future. Samuelson noted that the recent surge in activity by speculators in 
grain markets offered hedging opportunities to anyone who wanted them. 
He felt that any argument  alleging a systematic inadequacy of stocks would 
have to  rest on  specific grounds, such as Houthakker's suggestion that 
government activity in  grain inventorying had  created a  deficiency in 
private effort. Finally, he expressed his concern that development of an 
alleged buffer-stock policy by government could turn into a price-lifting 
operation over the long run. 
Several participants commented on the possible role of speculation in 
recent price fluctuations. Paul Davidson felt that the distinction between 
spot and forward prices illuminated the problem. The spot price is not 
anchored by  the  real costs  of  production, but  the  forward price that 
extends beyond a crop year should reflect the supply considerations as- 
sociated with the real costs  of  expanding production and the prices of 
inputs. Kaldor emphasized that the explosion of agricultural prices had 
extended to  world commodity  prices in  general. Cocoa  and  sugar had 
risen sharply in the absence of the objective factors that could explain the 
grain shortage. In the case of gold, the huge price rise was clearly purely 
speculative. Henry Wallich noted that the statistics reported on stocks of 
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short  run.  To the extent  that speculative  activity  has built  up stocks  in the 
hands of traders  and food processors,  these stocks are not accurately  re- 
ported  and hence  do not depress  the level of prices.  An improvement  of 
the reporting  system  that prevented  supplies  from disappearing  into un- 
reported  holdings  might have a favorable  effect on the stability  of com- 
modity  prices.  However,  Hathaway  expressed  doubt about the existence 
of large  private  stockpiles,  particularly  in the less developed  countries.  He 
felt that the Soviet  Union and China  were  the  world's  largest  stockholders, 
and the size of their  stocks  is officially  secret. 
The issue of export  controls  evoked several  comments.  William  Poole 
expressed  surprise  at the public's acceptance  of  export controls that 
shielded  Americans  from  relatively  minor  inconvenience  and  thereby  thrust 
the burden  of severe  food shortages  onto poor countries  for which the 
burdens  were  most onerous.  Lawrence  Krause  stated  his own strong  pro- 
clivities  to oppose  export  controls,  but conceded  the possible  usefulness  of 
sophisticated  policies that might permit some separation  of  domestic 
markets  from  foreign  markets.  He noted  that  the  United  States  is essentially 
the only major  seller  of grain  that operates  without  a national  marketing 
board.  Arthur  Okun  suggested  that marketing  boards  seemed  to be much 
more  acceptable  internationally  than  outright  export  controls,  even  though 
they could be operated  to pursue  the same objectives-for better or for 
worse. 
Robert  Hall viewed  American  opposition  to rising  agricultural  prices  as 
paradoxical.  As a net exporter  of agricultural  commodities,  the United 
States  stands  to benefit  from higher  prices.  George Perry  suggested  that 
the skewed  effects  on the distribution  of income  were  an issue  here;  rising 
prices  benefit  American  farmers  a lot, but they  hurt  the majority  of Ameri- 
can nonfarm  consumers.  Okun added that the public disapproval  also 
reflected  the macroeconomic  considerations  that translated  an agricul- 
tural inflation  into lower levels of real aggregate  demand  and hence de- 
pressed  output and employment.  Hall also doubted that fluctuations  in 
agricultural  prices  had important  welfare  costs. Hathaway  argued,  how- 
ever,  that  stability  in agricultural  prices  is desirable  on production  grounds; 
historical  data show that instability  is a major  inhibitor  to the expansion 
of agricultural  output. 